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in Japan  
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The Cancer Problem GEORGE CHILE, JR., M.D.

in the Hot War and Lose the Cold?

CHARLES E. OSCOOD

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# MIDWAY

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
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# SELECTION AND "SIGNIFICANCE" IN THE MODERN NOVEL

By David Daiches



D. H. LAWRENCE



VIRGINIA WOOLF

The modern novelist was born when the publicly-shared principle of selection disappeared, when it was no longer taken for granted that the outward actions of a character revealed the significant facts about him to a reader.

The changes that came over the English novel in the first half of the twentieth century—changes in technique, in point of view, in the whole relation between the author and his subject—represent something different from the changes to be expected in the development of an established art-form toward greater maturity, greater sophistication, or a more complex

handling of the medium, or in its decline into decadence. In the most significant novelists of this period there took place, either implicitly or explicitly, a radical redefinition of the nature and function of fiction.

The English novel, from its beginnings in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries to its great popular flowering in the nineteenth, had been essentially what might be called a "public instrument," basing its view of what was significant in human affairs on a generally agreed standard. Its plot patterns were constructed out of incidents and situations which were seen to matter in human affairs equally by writer and reader. Changes in social or economic position or in marital situation were obvious and agreed indications of a significant alteration in a character's state, and such changes marked the crises of virtually all eighteenth- and nineteenth-century plots.

The author's attitude to his characters was essentially one of observer; anything significant in his characters' behavior was at once indicated by a publicly observable movement toward some shift in status or fortune. The "two-travelers-might-have-been-seen" opening was fairly common in the nineteenth-century novel because it provided an appropriate entry into a work of fiction in which the characters were deployed before the reader (author and reader standing together, as it were, on the reviewing stand, with the author where necessary whispering explanatory remarks into the reader's ear) and revealed their inward development by their outward behavior. The correlation between internal and external, between moral or intellectual development and appropriate observable action or inaction, was taken for granted. And society was taken for granted. Men lived in a social and economic world which was real, and the most real part of their behavior was that which changed or in some way determined their position in that world.

All this is not surprising, for the English novel was, after all, the characteristic product of the English middle classes, and the middle classes have always been much concerned with social and economic position, with the relation between public esteem and real worth. In Jane Austen (though her novels appeared in the early nineteenth century) we find what is really the fine flower of the eighteenth-century novel, the projection of aspects of the human situation from a point of view which takes a stratified society absolutely for granted and which investigates the relation between private will and public status, between individual and social good, with extraordinary delicacy and wit. Every deviation from the implied norm of reasonable adaptation of individuality to status and of status to individuality yields its own brand of pride, prejudice, illusion, snobbery, selfishness, or folly, and life educates the educable in this adaptation: the success of the education is symbolized by a marriage in which personal desire, moral principle, and adequate fortune come together in each partner as well as in the couple. This is, of course, a wildly oversimplified description of Jane Austen's brilliant and subtle art; but the point relevant to the present investigation is that Jane Austen took a stable and hierarchic society absolutely for granted in the complete assurance that her readers shared the view of what is significant in human experience that is implied in the structure of her novels. As Virginia Woolf once remarked of Jane Austen, almost in envy: "To believe that your impressions hold good for others is to be released from the cramp and confinement of personality." One of the marks of the modern novelist is that he is unable to hold that belief.

Jane Austen was the last great English novelist to write before the Industrial Revolution changed the face of so much of England. After her, though the nineteenth-century novelist was equally committed to society and to a public sense of sig-

nificance, it was to a society always changing and always challenging the perceptive observer to inquire somewhat uneasily into the real relationship between public esteem and real moral worth. The middle classes, who rose so spectacularly in wealth and power in the Victorian period, were (for reasons which need not here detain us) committed to respectability, to a surface show of conformity and decency, which lends itself easily to hypocrisy. Much Victorian fiction investigates the limits of hypocrisy, the ways in which and the degree to which vice can achieve the reputation of virtue by manifesting virtue's outward signs. It is true that the hypocrite had already a long history in English drama and fiction—Blifil in Fielding's *Tom Jones* is an example that springs at once to mind—but rather as a character-type to be satirized than as an inevitable product of the way society operates, which is the way the Victorian novelist tended to treat him. Yet the norms underlying Victorian plot patterns remained public, and anything significant that occurred to a character was symbolized by change in fortune or status. Selection was still based on a criterion shared by reader and writer. It was clearly more significant for a character to run off with somebody else's wife than to drink a cup of tea or to suffer some inward shift in sensibility manifested by the merest flicker of an eyelid or perhaps by no outward sign at all. Human relationships were determined by human institutions, and the contact between people which those institutions made possible was real and satisfactory. In the modern novel, as we shall see, the novelist may have no assurance that it is the outward action which reveals the significant fact about his character, nor is he convinced that the public gestures provided by society—even by language, the most basic of all social instruments—can ever achieve real communication between individuals.

Every novelist must select from among the welter of events which make up human behavior: even if it were aesthetically desirable (which it obviously is not), it would clearly be physically impossible for a novelist to record everything which even his principal character was supposed to have done or thought or felt. If he selects, he selects on a principle. The older English novelist selected what were the significant things in the behavior of his characters on a principle publicly shared, and part of that publicly shared principle was the fact that what was significant in human events was itself manifested in publicly visible doing or suffering, in action or passion related to status or fortune.

The modern novelist is born when that publicly shared principle of selection and significance is no longer felt to exist, can no longer be depended on. The reasons for this breakdown of the public background of belief are related to new ideas in ethics, psychology, and many other matters as well as to social and economic factors. The relative stability of the Victorian world gave way to something much more confused and uncertain, and the shock to all established ideas provided by the First World War and the revelation of its horrors and futility helped to "carry alive into the heart by passion" (in Wordsworth's phrase) the sense of this breakdown. Of course, most ordinary people went on living their lives in accordance with the traditional morality and conventions of their fathers. It was only the sensitive *avant garde* who responded to this new feeling in the air and who believed, with Virginia Woolf, that they could no longer take it for granted that their impressions held good for others.

Some community of belief would seem to be necessary to all fictional art, and the apparent collapse of the public background represented a startling challenge to those novelists who were sensitive to it. They took up the challenge in various

ways. Some, like Virginia Woolf, tried to make a personal sense of belief persuasive to the reader while he read by adopting some of the techniques of lyric poetry and building up a pattern of highly charged symbolic events and reveries told in a prose whose suggestive overtones and rhythmic compulsions worked on the experienced reader to reproduce in him the sense of significance out of which the author's vision arose.

James Joyce, in his most characteristic work, sought for technical devices which would enable him to present all possible points of view simultaneously, showing the same persons and events as at once heroic and trivial, splendid and silly, important and unimportant.

Joseph Conrad multiplied points of view in the telling of a story so that the tentativeness of all patterns of significance was established and the lonely truth at the heart of individual experience remained teasingly mysterious.

D. H. Lawrence constructed his plots in such a way as to use social institutions as devices for probing the difficulties which lie in the way of proper human relationships and showed his characters discovering (or failing to discover) their own sense of meaning in those relationships through experiences that are essentially poetic and even mystical in nature and are projected by means of a quite new kind of fictional symbolism.

The great surge of experimentation in fiction which went on in the 1920's and 1930's was in large measure caused by the novelists' search for devices that would enable them to solve the problem of the breakdown of a public sense of significance each in his own way. All the novelists mentioned brought some of the techniques of poetry into prose fiction. The novel inevitably became a subtler and in some senses a more difficult literary form than it had hitherto been—not necessarily better, because the great Victorian novelists at their best found perfect ways of dealing with their kind of fictional imagination, but more com-

plex, because the modern novelist had additional problems to solve. The heroic age of experiment and expansion in the English novel was thus the product of what might be called a crisis in civilization, not the result of a wilful desire to "make it new" and be original for the sake of being original. Those novelists who were content with the old plot-patterns, who were content to emphasize the social-documentary aspect of their art and to rely on the traditional changes in status and fortune to mark the high points of significance, often produced interesting and skilful novels, but novels which are now more documents of interest to the social historian or the historian of taste than illuminating explorations of aspects of the human situation. Virginia Woolf called Bennett, Wells, and Galsworthy "materialists" and complained that their work never really captured the inward vision. "Whether we call it life of spirit, truth or reality, this, the essential thing, has moved off, or on, and refuses to be contained any longer in such ill-fitting vestments as we provide."

Two other factors in addition to the breakdown of a public sense of significance help to produce what we have called the modern novel. One is the new concept of time as continuous flow rather than as a series of separate points, a concept independently enunciated in France, in Henri Bergson's concept of *la durée*, and in America by William James with his interest in the continuity of consciousness.

Bergsonian ideas about time were in the air in the 1920's and influenced even those writers who had not read Bergson. It led to a suspicion of the old kind of plot which carried the characters forward from moment to moment in a precise chronological sequence, and there developed instead the kind of narrative texture that moved backward and forward with a new freedom to try to capture the sense of time as it actually operates in the human awareness of it. Closely linked to this new view of time was the view of consciousness deriving in a general way from the



work of Freud and Jung but concentrating on the fact of the multiplicity of consciousness, the presence in the given consciousness of all it had ever experienced and perhaps also of all that the race had experienced. The individual personality is the sum of the individual's memories, and to regard the past as something to be recalled by a conscious effort of memory is on this view to do violence to the facts of experience. The past exists always in the present, coloring and determining the nature of the present response, and to tell the truth about a character's reaction to any situation we must tell the whole truth about everything that has ever happened to him. The novelist who has been influenced by this view of time and consciousness will seek ways of communicating to the reader the simultaneity of different levels of consciousness, and he will also realize that the whole truth about a mature person can be told by probing into his past through presenting the full texture of his present consciousness: this results in new kinds of fictional techniques.

Concern with individual consciousness, its multiplicity and ability to store up the whole of the individual's past history which is always relevant and always in operation in one way or another, leads to emphasis on the individual's loneliness. Every man is the prisoner of his own private consciousness, his unique train of association, which results in turn from his own unique past. The public gestures he makes toward communication can never be more than approximate, and he can never rely on their being understood. Indeed, insofar as the gestures are public they are bound to be falsified. The signals each individual flashes to the public world are bound to be in some degree misunderstood by that world, because every other person will read them in the light of the person's own private history. Society is thus in a sense unreal; its institutions inevitably blunt and coarsen the truth about the individual self, providing means of communication that can only distort. Loneliness is seen as the necessary



condition of man. Yet the desire to communicate is also a deeply imbedded human instinct, and the desire to escape from loneliness one of the chief human preoccupations.

To what extent is such an escape possible? The characters in Joyce's *Ulysses* who are shown so often as drinking with and to each other in bars—and communal drinking is one of the most primal gestures of community, embodied in most religious rituals—making contact with each other through social gestures of conviviality, are at the same time shown as haunted by private thoughts and emotions, the products of their individual pasts, which can never be reflected in the social gesture. Social conventions are seen as empty and mechanical, bearing no real relationship to the inner life of men. What E. M. Forster called "the great society" is meaningless; at best only "the little society" can have any validity. The carefully pursued friendship of the small group may produce the only working society that is possible.

We can see the same theme pursued by American novelists, notably by Ernest Hemingway, most of whose novels are devoted to an exploration of the secret society, the small community of men who by sharing experiences and acting out a code together can impose some meaning on the empty nothingness of social convention and pretension. In Virginia Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway* we see the heroine searching for means of communicating with others: the novel is dominated by her intention of giving a party that evening, and it is at the party that the climax occurs. Parties bring people together; yet the unity they impose is superficial and in a profound sense we are lonelier then ever in a crowd. While Mrs. Dalloway seeks ways of establishing real contact with others, she is at the same time dedicated to the preservation of her own unique individuality, which is the basic condition for an adequate existence. She had refused to accept Peter Walsh, whom she loved, as a husband, because

he had wanted to dominate her personality, and had instead accepted a husband whose affection manifested itself more shyly and gave her more freedom. Yet that freedom suggested loneliness too, and she is haunted by images of herself in a lonely tower cut off from the cheerful conversation and activities of the people outside. Do we become part of all other people in death? she wonders at one point. At the same time the novel explores other aspects of loneliness and community, presenting in the madness and suicide of Septimus Warren Smith the dilemma of a man who, through his war experience, has lost all sense of the reality of the world of other people and who, when forced to pretend that that reality is real for him by engaging in meaningless community gestures, is driven to the final extremity.

In a different way, yet with a basic similarity of theme, Conrad explores again and again the ways in which social and political life are both necessary and corrupting. Lawrence sought a way out of this characteristic modern problem by insisting that true love consists not in merging (he castigated Whitman for believing in the merging of individuals) but in the recognition of the mystical core of otherness in the beloved, and, if that otherness is also a sexual otherness, the experience of being able to transcend the self through participation in otherness is more likely to be realized. Throughout all these novelists the question "How is love possible in a world of individuals imprisoned by their own private and unique consciousness?" is asked and probed in a great variety of ways. Loneliness is the great reality, love the great necessity: how can the two be brought together? The more public and social the world, the less real it is likely to be, so neither the earlier public view of significance nor the earlier confidence in the role of society can be maintained. Much modern fiction is the charting of a way out of solipsism.

Thus the three major factors that have influenced and in a sense produced the modern novel—the breakdown of public

agreement about what is significant in experience and therefore about what the novelist ought to select, the new view of time, and the new view of the nature of consciousness—co-operate to encourage the novelist to concentrate on aspects of the human situation which were not the major concern of earlier novelists (only one major earlier novelist, Laurence Sterne, was concerned with loneliness and love in the modern sense) and to discover new techniques for achieving their new aims. There were, of course, other factors at work, but these three seem to be those which most consistently, though in very different ways, affected those great novelists of the first half of this century who in their new insights and technical experiments permanently enlarged the bounds of the art of fiction.

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

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*Despite a decrease in the incidence  
of some cancers,*



*the death rates  
from most common cancers  
remain unchanged.*

*"Not until we understand the factors  
that control the growth of normal cells  
will the problem of cancer be solved,"  
says this surgeon.*



# *the Cancer Problem*

A Comprehensive Review by George Crile, Jr., M.D.

## EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT ON THE NATURAL HISTORY OF CANCER

### *Failure of Treatment To Alter Death Rate*

Historically, it is surgeons who have been chiefly concerned with the treatment of cancer [a malignant tumor, composed of rapidly proliferating cells that spread to adjacent areas, often to secondary locations], and, since much of surgery is based upon

mechanistic concepts, it is not surprising that the cancer problem has been approached mechanically. To detect a cancer when it is as small as possible and to excise it as widely as possible have been the surgical challenges of the twentieth century.

Remarkable technical advances have been made in response to these challenges. Cancers have been diagnosed and treated earlier in their development, and more extensive operations have been performed with fewer postoperative deaths than ever before. Despite these apparent advances, the death rate from most of the common types of cancer, age adjusted per 100,000 people, has not changed significantly. The incidence of some cancers—like those of the lung—has increased; the incidence of others—like cancer of the stomach—has decreased. The results of the treatment of some cancers—like those of the cervix and the mouth—have improved, and the death rate from these tumors is decreasing, partly because of improvement in their diagnosis and treatment and partly because of a decrease in their incidence. Aside from these exceptions, the death rates from most common cancers remain unchanged.

For the last fifty years, despite the unchanged death rates, the reported rates of cure of many types of cancer have risen steadily. This paradox can be explained by assuming that with better methods of diagnosis there has been included a higher proportion of cases of low malignancy. Perhaps, also, the rising rate of "cure" in the face of an unchanged death rate is a reflection of the fallacy of using the "five-year cure" as a yardstick to measure the success of treatment. In any event, the failure of earlier diagnosis and more radical treatment to solve the problem of cancer has brought about a reappraisal of long-accepted methods of treatment.

Although the term "biologic predeterminism" is relatively new, it is a concept as old as clinical practice: that each cancer has its own natural history and each patient with cancer should

be treated as having an individual problem. Certain types of cancer—like leukemia—have metastasized systemically by the time they are first recognized with our present methods of diagnosis and are incurable by our present methods of treatment. [Metastasis is the spread of a disease. It is applied most often to cancer cells appearing in a new spot, not necessarily adjacent to the original cancer]. Other types—like basal cell cancers of the skin—are of the lowest order of malignancy; treated or untreated, they are not apt to metastasize. Between these two extremes lies a middle group for which early and radical treatment may tip the scales in favor of the patient. "Predeterminism," in short, is the frank admission of the facts about cancer that every good clinician knows.

When the principles of biologic predeterminism were first spoken out loud, an astonishing storm of controversy arose. Those who upheld individualization of treatment often were accused of "violating the principles of cancer surgery." Yet out of this controversy came a re-evaluation of surgical results and a trend away from treatment of cancer that was purely anatomic and mechanical. Gradually, surgeons realized that no formula could be written to simplify the decision how a specific cancer should be treated, that the widest possible operation was not always the best treatment for the patient, and that in some types of cancer a delay in treatment was less important than had formerly been supposed. One of the greatest contributions to this line of thought came from the rapidly developing field of cancer cytology [i.e., exploring the structure and function of cancer cells].

Ever since the turn of the century, cancer cells have been demonstrated occasionally in the blood stream of patients with cancer; pathologists have called attention to the tendency of certain tumors to invade blood vessels; and the hematogenous spread of cancer is now clearly recognized. But how frequently

cancer cells can be demonstrated in the blood stream was not appreciated until 1955, when Fisher and Turnbull reported finding cancer cells in the blood of one-third of a series of patients with operable cancers of the colon and Engell reported that in up to 59 per cent of all patients with operable cancers of colon, breast, stomach, and lung, cancer cells were demonstrable in the blood of the veins that drained the affected parts. Later, Sandberg and Moore, in a series of patients with advanced cancers, were able to raise this percentage even higher. Small cancers seemed as likely as large ones to shed their cells into the blood stream. It was reasoned that, since cancer cells can be demonstrated so frequently with relatively crude techniques, quite probably at some time in the development of most true cancers and perhaps long before they can be recognized clinically, cancer cells are widely disseminated throughout the body.

The discovery that cancer cells frequently enter the blood stream has had a profound effect on surgeons' thought. Suddenly the problem of the spread of cancer is given a reverse twist. No longer is the question, "What makes a cancer shed its cells into the blood stream?" Rather, it is, "Why do not all the cancer cells that enter the blood stream survive and grow as metastases?" No longer is the basic problem to remove the tumor before it has spread to the blood stream or to remove it so widely that every cancer cell is excised. The entry of cells into the blood stream—due, perhaps, to the motility and lack of cohesion of cancer cells—appears to be an intrinsic part of the process of malignant change. When cancer cells are widely disseminated in the blood, the mechanical aims of surgery or localized radiation therapy are not attainable. The real problem is to remove the primary tumor completely and at the same time prevent the circulating cancer cells from implanting themselves and growing.



## FACTORS INFLUENCING IMPLANTATION AND GROWTH OF METASTASES

Forty-five years ago Jones and Rous injected a suspension of cells from a transplantable cancer into the abdominal cavity of susceptible mice. The transplanted cells did not grow except occasionally at the site of the needle puncture. But when a tiny glass rod was placed in the abdominal cavity a week before the cancer cells were injected, cancer developed at the site of the rod. When a silicate powder was introduced before the cells were injected, carcinosis ensued. Injury by the powder promoted the growth of cancer cells that normally would have been destroyed by the host's resistance. Perhaps the same factors that promoted the repair of damaged tissues stimulated the growth of the cancer. The fact that cancers of the stomach which have shed their cells into the peritoneal cavity of ovulating women tend to localize on the ovary, a site of monthly trauma, suggests that the cells of human cancer behave like those of the transplantable cancers of laboratory animals. In patients with carcinosis, moreover, cancer cells often implant themselves in the incisions of abdominal operations or at the site of paracenteses [tapping to drain fluid].

Although local trauma favors the implantation and growth of cancer cells, there are other, more systemic, factors that produce similar results. Bone sarcomas [tumors made up of tissue similar to embryonic connective tissues, usually malignant] have such a remarkable tendency to metastasize to the lungs that few are cured by operations. In some cases treatment seems to increase the tendency to metastasize. For example, prompt amputation of a limb bearing an osteogenic [bone] sarcoma may promote rather than prevent the development of pulmonary metastases. Sometimes the parents of children with bone sarcomas are not willing to accept the necessity of amputation,

and operation may be delayed for several years. In these cases the time of appearance of pulmonary metastasis appears to be related more closely to the time of amputation than to the time the disease was diagnosed.

These unexpected clinical results led Mider in 1956 to state: "A growing primary malignant neoplasm [a mass of new tissue, of no physiological function, whose cells proliferate independently of surrounding tissues] may conceivably restrict the ability of its metastases to grow." This concept has given rise to a series of laboratory investigations. Schatten and others found that amputation of the tumor-bearing legs of mice caused a striking increase in incidence and size of pulmonary metastases. Various tumors and various strains of mice were used in these experiments. In one series, amputation of the contralateral leg did not increase the incidence of spontaneous metastasis. Yet, in other experiments, a nonspecific laparotomy [removal of part of the abdominal wall] increased the incidence of pulmonary metastases from intravenously injected cancer cells. These results suggest that in some cases non-specific side-effects of operative trauma may favor the localization and growth of metastases and also that removal of the primary tumor may remove some humoral [pertaining to a bodily fluid; here, the blood] restraint that the tumor exerted on its metastases.

Further evidence of the importance of humoral as well as mechanical factors in the development of metastases has been given by Fisher and Fisher, who studied the growth of hepatic [liver] metastases in rats. A suspension of a known number of cancer cells was injected into the portal vein, and the incidence of hepatic metastases for that number of cells was established. When the rats were subjected to partial hepatectomies immediately after injection of the cells, the number of hepatic metastases was doubled. When the liver was manipulated without being removed, or when the animals were given the serum

of hepatectomized rats simultaneously with the injection of cancer cells, the number of metastases again was doubled. When the abdomen was opened and the liver massaged two weeks after the injection of the cancer cells, the incidence of metastases at four weeks was more than double that in the unmassaged control series. Neither nephrectomy [removal of a kidney] nor extensive operations on the back had any stimulating effect on the hepatic metastasis. Manipulation of the liver seems to stimulate the growth of dormant cancer which if undisturbed, does not grow.

The explanation of these findings is not yet clear. Amputation of a tumor-bearing extremity before a certain time in the development of a tumor protects against metastasis and usually brings about a cure. There is also a time beyond which amputation of a tumor-bearing leg no longer controls but rather stimulates the tumor to metastasize. Carefully controlled clinical studies must be made before the results of these animal experiments can be distilled into a principle that is applicable to human beings. It is necessary to determine for each type of cancer exactly when an operation will stimulate rather than prevent dissemination of the cancer cells. Early and wide excisions are only part of the answer to the cure of cancer.

#### IMMUNOLOGIC ASPECTS OF THE HOST'S RESISTANCE

##### *Clinical Evidence of the Host's Resistance*

There is increasing clinical evidence that, in certain advanced stages of cancer, radical operations not only may fail to cure but may shorten life. Haagensen and Stout and McWhirter have presented clinical evidence to suggest that this is the case in breast cancer. There is less precise but still highly suggestive evidence that simple mastectomies [removal of a breast] with

or without radiation are followed by a higher proportion of five-year survivals than are radical mastectomies in similar cases. There is even evidence that the survival rate of selected patients with certain types of cancer of the rectum may be higher after electrocoagulation of the tumor than after combined abdominoperineal resection. In all these instances the selection of cases for one or another type of treatment is so variable that the reported results are far from convincing. Yet, in the light of (a) the increased tendency for metastasis to appear in patients after amputation of an extremity for a bone sarcoma, (b) the increased tendency of cancers in mice to metastasize after amputation, and (c) the increased number of hepatic metastases that follow manipulation of the liver in rats, it is necessary to re-examine the possibility that at certain stages in the development of certain cancers extensive operations may disseminate, rather than limit the spread of, the disease.

*Possible Role of Regional Lymph Nodes in Defense  
Mechanisms of Host*

For many years it has been recognized that lymph nodes are efficient filters that can trap cancer cells and prevent them from entering the general circulation. But usually the site of the primary cancer is richly supplied with blood vessels as well as with lymphatics, and, since cancer cells can as readily enter blood vessels as they can lymphatic channels, it would seem that the mechanical function of the lymph nodes is unimportant in preventing the systemic spread of cancer. The most important question is whether or not the regional lymph nodes, or some localized relationship of the tissues of the host to those of the tumor, exert an immunologic control on the growth of the cancer cells.

As early as 1926, Murphy at the Rockefeller Institute raised the question of the role of lymphocytes in the body's resistance

to cancer. More recently Black, Opler, and Speer have observed that the prognosis for cancers of the breast and the stomach is much better when the primary tumor is infiltrated with lymphocytes and the regional lymph nodes show a type of hyperplasia [abnormal increase of normal cells; not cancerous growth per se] that they describe as "sinus histiocytosis." This type of reaction (or even a hyperplasia so extreme that it is described as a sarcoid reaction) may be seen in lymph nodes adjacent to some malignant tumors. Histologically, these reactions are the same as those that occur in the so-called "homograft-rejection reaction," in which tissue from an antigenically different animal of the same species is rejected by its new host. [An antigen is any toxin or enzyme which induces the formation of antibodies, or substances which bring about immunity.]

The possibility that certain spontaneous cancers may be different antigenically from their hosts was studied extensively a few decades ago and is once more under intensive study. Some investigators believe that the change to malignancy involves chiefly the loss of specific antigens. Others suggest that alterations of antigens take place as the cells change to cancer. The situation can best be summarized by saying that there is a strong possibility that the cells of certain tumors in man may be antigenically different from the normal cells from which they arose and that immunologic responses of the fixed-tissue type may be one way the spread of cancer is controlled. In the words of Amos: "Evidence of incompatibility has been found in so many types of tumors either through transplantation, through the demonstration of localized antibodies, or through the demonstration of neutralizing antibodies that actual or potential defense mechanisms can be postulated against most types of tumor certainly after transplantations and even in the original host."

One of the most sensitive of the body's immunologic reactions, and one of the most extensively studied, is the process by

which a homograft of skin is rejected. When a piece of skin is grafted from a mouse of one strain onto a mouse of another, it will at first grow quite normally and later will be rejected. The graft becomes infiltrated with lymphocytes, the regional lymph nodes become hyperplastic, and the grafted skin is destroyed. This is called the "first set" reaction, in which the skin survives only about ten days.

If, after rejection of the first graft, a second graft from the same donor is placed on the same recipient, the entire process is speeded up, and the skin is rejected in about half the previous time. This is called the "second set" or "immune" reaction.

The immunity that causes the second set reaction cannot be passively transferred by the serum of a sensitized animal, and there is no demonstrable evidence of the development of serologic antibodies. The immune reaction is of the cellular or fixed-tissue type and appears to be carried by lymphocytes.

If a regional lymph node taken from a mouse that has rejected a homograft is minced and injected into the peritoneal cavity of a mouse of the same strain, the immunized lymphocytes from the node will confer immunity upon the new host. A host thus immunized will reject a first graft by the second set or immune type of reaction. In the mouse, only the regional nodes carry this immunity. Nodes contralateral to the graft confer no immunity on the second host.

These interesting observations of the immunologic importance of regional lymph nodes in the homograft reaction immediately raise the question whether or not the regional nodes play a part in the defense of the body against the spread of cancer. For example, could lymphocytes immunized in tissues adjacent to the tumor and in the nodes that drain it circulate through the body and destroy the cancer cells that so often enter the blood stream? Does removal of regional lymph nodes at a time when cancer cells from the primary tumor are circulating

in the blood stream tend to lower the resistance of the body to the implantation and growth of these cells? Is it possible that in some types of cancer the regional lymph nodes, even if involved by cancer, are still playing a part in the body's systemic defense against circulating cancer cells? At present there is no conclusive evidence for or against these suggestions, but they should be borne in mind as possible means of explaining why in some types of cancer radical operations may promote the development of metastases. Studies of the effect of radiation on the development of metastases are of interest in this connection.

Kaplan and Murphy, and later Von Essen working with Kaplan, found that, in mice, local radiation of a radioresistant metastasizing tumor was followed by an increase in the incidence of pulmonary metastases of from 9.6 per cent to 43.5 per cent. This change was not the result of a radiation-induced mutation, for, when the radiation-induced metastases were transplanted to other mice, the resulting tumors showed no increased tendency to metastasize. Radiation of the host before the tumor was transplanted did not increase its tendency to metastasize, nor did radiation of the tumor before it was transplanted to the new host. It was concluded that the radiation increased the incidence of metastasis by producing a transient local disturbance in the host-tumor relationship.

If either radiation or radical removal of a tumor and its regional lymph nodes may eliminate immunized lymphocytes or other immunized tissues that play a part in the body's resistance to circulating tumor cells, perhaps, in some types of cancer, consideration should be given to the staging of operations—first, removal of the primary tumor to cut off the source of circulating cells and, later, removal or radiation of involved regional nodes. In our search for the ultimate answers, we must not forget that observations from both clinic and laboratory suggest that complete removal of at least the primary tumor as early as possible



usually affords the best chance of cure. The reason may be that large numbers of cancer cells do not enter the circulation early in the development of a tumor, or perhaps some such process as "enhancement" is involved (similar to desensitization)—products of the tumor overcoming the immunologic resistance of the host. Whatever the explanation, patients with small tumors removed early are more likely to be cured than are those with larger ones removed later.

#### ENDOCRINE ASPECTS OF THE HOST'S RESISTANCE

##### *Role of Hormones in Producing Cancer*

Although many of the endocrine balances are complicated, at least one endocrine axis appears to be a simple feedback system—the thyroid-pituitary axis. Here the carcinogenic [cancer-causing] effects of a trophic [nourishing] hormone have been clearly demonstrated.

If thiouracil is fed to rats, their thyroids undergo hyperplasia, then become nodular [lumpy], and some develop cancers that metastasize and may kill. Up to this point the cancers are dependent on the endocrine disturbance that induced them; that is, their survival requires an excess of circulating thyroid-stimulating hormone (TSH). If thiouracil is withdrawn so that thyroid function returns to normal and the pituitary no longer produces an excess of TSH, the tumors stop growing or may even regress. Feeding of thyroid suppresses the output of TSH and produces the same results. In thiouracil-fed animals, feeding of thyroid prevents the development of hyperplasia, nodules, and cancers of the thyroid.

Dependent thyroid cancers, serially transplanted into hosts that have been made susceptible by being fed thiouracil, can be carried for a long time, and the effects of their prolonged exposure to TSH can be studied. Eventually, many formerly dif-



ferentiated and TSH-dependent cancers become undifferentiated, highly malignant, and autonomous, so that their growth no longer can be controlled by thyroid feeding or by reducing the amount of circulating TSH.

The transition of a normal thyroid cell through the stages of hyperplasia, nodule, endocrine-dependent cancer, and, finally, undifferentiated autonomous cancer has been reproduced in many target organs under stimulation by trophic hormones. For example, when an animal is castrated and one of its gonads is transplanted to the spleen so that the hormones from the transplanted gonad are carried through the portal vein and destroyed by the liver, the effect on the pituitary is similar to that of castration; that is, an excess of gonadotrophin is secreted. In response to the excess, the transplanted gonad undergoes hyperplasia and, eventually, malignant change. These changes can be prevented by giving enough androgens or estrogens to suppress the pituitary's output of gonadotrophin.

The mechanism that controls the development of cancer in target organs, such as the breast, is more complex than a simple axis relationship. The presence of estrogens is essential to the development of normal breast tissue, and the amount of circulating estrogens also influences the growth of certain breast cancers. Yet the response of normal breast tissue to estrogens is not quantitative. Administration of estrogens to adult menstruating women does not stimulate the growth of breast tissue. If estrogens were always responsible for the development of cancer of the breast, it would be difficult to explain why in postmenopausal women estrogens are more likely than are androgens to inhibit the growth of cancer. It would be equally hard to explain why in mice the mammotrophic tumor of the pituitary causes progressive growth of mammary tissue.

The studies of Hadfield indicate that development of the immature breast does not occur in the absence of estrogens and

that it is quantitatively related to the amount of pituitary hormone that the animal receives. The growth of breast tissue and some of the tumors that arise from it appear to be controlled by a complex system of endocrine balances. The same may be true of the prostate, for cases have been reported in which administration of estrogens failed to control the growth of prostatic cancers but remission was brought about by administration of androgens.

Most cancers of the prostate and thyroid, 30 per cent or more of cancers of the breast, and many lymphomas respond, at least temporarily, to alterations in the patient's endocrine balance. The most lasting controls have been effected on differentiated tumors of the prostate and the thyroid.

Mammary cancers in premenopausal women often regress after oöphorectomy [removal of an ovary], but these remissions tend to be transitory. The tumor cells resume their growth within a few months or years. If at this point the adrenal glands are removed, the tumor may regress again. Escape from control seems, therefore, to depend more on compensatory changes in the host's production of hormones than on a changed response of the tumor cells. Perhaps the ultimate failure of hypophysectomy [removal of the pituitary gland] to control the growth of cancer is also related to compensatory mechanisms within the host with emergence of the hypothalamus as a source of growth-stimulating hormones.

There is evidence for the opposite point of view also. Cases have been reported in which cancers of the breast first regressed on administration of androgens, then recurred, and then again regressed in response to treatment with estrogens. This suggests that in some cases tumor cells, like bacteria yeasts and molds, are capable of adaptive enzymatic changes in response to changes in their environment. On a unicellular level, Lamarck-

ism is again gaining acceptance, for such phenomena as the Barrett-Deringer adaptation of tumors can be explained only as inheritance of acquired characters. It is likely that both adaptation of the tumor and compensatory alteration in the endocrine balances of the host are involved in the escape of tumors from endocrine control.

For ethical reasons it is difficult to experiment on human tumors; therefore, we do not know what proportion of cancers of the thyroid, breast, and prostate could be controlled permanently by endocrine treatment. Clinical research along these lines has been limited to tumors that have recurred after conventional surgical and radiologic therapy. In general, these uncontrolled tumors are the poorly differentiated ones that have metastasized widely, that is, the types that in experimental animals are least susceptible to endocrine control. These are the metastasizing cancers that Greene found will grow in the anterior chambers of guinea pigs' eyes, most of them having progressed to the stage of at least partial autonomy. It is not surprising that in such cases endocrine therapy rarely effects prolonged or permanent control. Perhaps if the localized, surgically curable tumors of breast, thyroid, or prostate were treated with endocrine therapy initially, there would be a much higher incidence of prolonged remissions than is observed in the unpromising cases that are given this type of treatment now. In short, the potential endocrine control of tumors may be much more effective than we think.

There is another side to the coin of endocrine carcinogenesis. When the balance of an endocrine axis is disturbed, malignant change may occur not only in the cells of the target organs but also in the cells that manufacture the trophic hormone. For example, when the thyroid is destroyed by radioiodine ( $I^{131}$ ), the ensuing stimulation of the cells that manufacture thyrotrophic hormone may result in malignant tumors arising from

the thyrotrophic cells of the pituitary. Absence of an end organ's hormone may be as carcinogenic to the cells that manufacture the trophic hormone as excess of the trophic hormone is to the target-organ cells.

*Carcinogenesis of "Endocrine" Origin in Non-target Organs of the Recognized Endocrine System*

Endogenous chemicals, that is, hormones, may be capable of producing cancer in more organs than those known to be within the control of the endocrine system. The growth of liver and kidney cells is under some type of chemical control, for compensatory hyperplasias have been induced in these organs by humoral means. It is possible that the growth of cells of the stomach, colon, skin, and other organs are, if we but knew it, under similar types of systemic or local control.

The gastric antrum [stomach cavity] has a humoral function that stimulates the cells of the cardia [opening of the esophagus into the stomach] to form acid. If for some reason the cells of the fundus [lower part of the stomach] are unable to produce acid, which is the case in pernicious anemia, the antrum probably reflects this failure by overproducing its acid-stimulating hormone, gastrin. If the stimulation of the cells of the antrum by absence of acid and the stimulation of the cells of the cardia by an excess of gastrin were to continue for long periods of time, it is possible that malignant change could be induced at either end of the axis, just as in the thyroid-pituitary axis. Such a mechanism would explain the high incidence of gastric cancer in persons with pernicious anemia or gastric anacidity.

Hyperplasia of lymph nodes occurs in response to contact of their lymphocytes with an antigen. Usually such contacts are brief, and the antigen is dealt with promptly by the development of immunity. But, when the antigenic stimulation is prolonged, as in the autoimmunity [immunity brought about by

processes within the body] to thyroglobulin [the iodine-containing protein of the thyroid gland] that occurs in struma lymphomatosa (Hashimoto's thyroiditis), there is a tendency for the lymphocytes to undergo malignant change. Lymphosarcoma and reticulum-cell sarcoma of the thyroid sometimes appear to originate in association with struma lymphomatosa. Could the antigen that stimulated the intense lymphocytic infiltration of the thyroid and the hyperplasia of regional nodes have acted like a trophic hormone on the lymphocytes and induced this malignant change? Can the beneficial effect of cortisone on certain lymphomas [tumors of lymphoid tissue] and lymphatic leukemias be explained by an assumption that the cortisone, in suppressing the immunologic response, is suppressing the trophic effect of the antigen on a still-dependent tumor that arose from the lymphocytes? Could increased exposure to antigenic stimuli, such as repeated immunizations, be responsible for some of the recent increase in the incidence of leukemias and lymphomas? These are a few of the questions that come to mind.

The steps by which a normal cell becomes an autonomous cancer cell are not well defined. As Foulds has shown, the cell may change in respect to only one malignant characteristic instead of evolving steadily in all characteristics of malignancy. An end organ under stimulation by a trophic hormone may undergo uniform hyperplasia that remains stable for years; or a single cell and its clone of descendants may be particularly sensitive to stimulation and outgrow their neighboring cells to form a nodule. The factors that control these various responses are poorly understood, but in experimental animals a basic principle is apparent: Either prolonged stimulation of the normal cells of a target organ by an excess of a trophic hormone or an oversensitive response of a cell and its descendants to normal amounts of a trophic hormone may result in malignant change.

In the future, the clinical application of this knowledge may help to prevent many cancers as well as to control the growth of those cancers that are still in the dependent stage.

#### CHEMOTHERAPY OF CANCER

The endocrine approach to the control of cancer involves a search for specific substances which specifically influence the growth of a certain type of cancer cell. In contrast, the present chemotherapeutic approach is a search for a substance that affects the growth of all cancers. It is hoped that some difference—enzymatic, metabolic, or otherwise—can be demonstrated between the malignant and the non-malignant cell.

The results of clinical trials have been tantalizing but, with one exception, not impressive. Only for the bizarre tumor chorionepithelioma—which in reality is a transplant from the products of conception and is well known to be subject to spontaneous remissions—has chemotherapy been followed by more than palliative results.

Rapidly growing anaplastic cancer cells [cancer cells reverting to embryonic form, the change that results in malignancy] are highly susceptible to chemotherapeutic attack, but, unfortunately, so are the rapidly growing embryonal cells of bone marrow and gastrointestinal mucosa. The trouble is that the margin of safety between therapeutic and toxic doses is too small and the ability of the cancer cells to adapt (either enzymatically or by selection) is too great. Nevertheless, chemotherapy is of value in the treatment of chorionepitheliomas, it potentiates the effects of radiation in the treatment of certain embryonal tumors, and it sometimes controls the local growth of cancer when used in the pleural or peritoneal cavities. Elsewhere it offers little more than a possibility of brief palliation.

The urgent wish to find a clinical answer to the problem of cancer often distracts us from developing the basic knowledge necessary for its solution. Unfortunately, there is no short cut. The valid answers to those problems that have been solved were found by patient separation of the individual types of tumor and application of specific types of treatment. The trial-and-error attempt to find a poison that will selectively destroy all cancer cells may prove to be a mid-century version of the over-emphasis placed earlier on the empiric development of surgical and radiologic techniques.

#### EFFECTS OF RADIATION ON CANCER

Radiation has been widely used to treat cancer, but little is known of the mechanism by which it accomplishes its results. It is assumed by some that the effects of radiation are direct and that radiation destroys the tumor by killing the dividing cells. But there is evidence that the process is much more complex than this, that the action is indirect.

Shielding the bone marrow of a single leg of an animal subjected to otherwise total body irradiation protects against the leukemia that develops if the leg is not shielded. Thymic [relating to the thymus, a gland in the lower throat] tumors can be induced by total body irradiation, but local irradiation over the thymus does not cause tumors of the thymus. Shielding one leg prevents the development of the thymic tumors in mice subjected to otherwise total body irradiation, and the same protection is afforded by injection of normal homologous bone marrow. "The real carcinogenic agent," according to Kaplan and associates, "is the normal endogenous growth stimulus for the thymus acting over a prolonged period upon the injured gland under circumstances in which it cannot respond normally."



If the carcinogenic effects of radiation are indirect, perhaps the therapeutic effect of radiation on clinical cancers is also indirect, or at least not entirely due to a direct action on the cancer cell. Single layers of cells in tissue culture can survive much greater doses of radiation than can cells of the same type in their natural location. If we could explain this curious fact, we might have the key to one of the major biologic effects of radiation on the cell.

Some cancers are radiosensitive and melt away after minimal radiation, whereas others are so resistant that they continue to grow despite amounts of radiation that destroy cells of the surrounding normal tissue. It is often said that the more undifferentiated, rapidly growing tumors respond best to radiation, but this is not necessarily true. If the lymphomas (which tend to grow rapidly and are very radiosensitive) are eliminated from consideration, there are no definite correlations between rate of growth or degree of anaplasia and sensitivity to radiation. Rapidly growing anaplastic tumors of stomach, pancreas, and thyroid are among the most radioresistant tumors, whereas well-differentiated tumors of skin or breast may respond well to radiation therapy. In the light of these facts, it is difficult to accept the view that radiation controls the growth of cancer by a direct, lethal action on the dividing cell. It seems likely that more complex disturbances in the mechanism of cellular reproduction, or perhaps indirect mechanisms, are at work.

In certain types of cancer, notably cancer of the breast, radiation may control the growth of the tumor for a long time even when viable tumor cells remain. It may be that radiation in doses that do not destroy the life or function of a cell can render it incapable of dividing. In tissue culture, irradiated cells may live but may be unable to multiply. Irradiated legs of amphibians are incapable of regeneration. It is difficult to believe (as has often been said) that the fibrous tissue resulting from radia-



tion "traps" a growing cancer. It seems more likely that radiation diminishes or abolishes the growth potential of the cancer cell and that the fibrous reaction is the result rather than the cause of the cancer's decreased energy of growth. Doniach observed that, when the thyroids of young rats are irradiated and then immediately stimulated by the feeding of thiouracil, the growth response of the cells is normal. If, however, the feeding of thiouracil is delayed for a few weeks, the irradiated thyroids fail to respond fully to the growth stimulus. Three months after radiation, healthy-looking thyroid cells are still present, but feeding of thiouracil fails to stimulate the irradiated cells to grow or to divide. It appears that radiation has destroyed their reproductive function without killing them. This principle may explain some of the clinical observations that have been made on irradiated cancers that seem to be incapable of further growth although they are apparently viable.

#### POSSIBLE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL FACTORS THAT RESTRAIN CELL GROWTH

##### *Nature of Local Controls*

What are the factors that control the growth and reproduction of the normal cell? If these were recognized, we might be able to control the growth of many cancers.

Every living mammalian cell makes antigens that are specific for the individual animal and probably also for the type of cell. These antigens are not recognizable until the cell, transplanted into another individual of a different genetic strain, evokes an immune reaction in the new host. Why does the cell go to all the trouble of elaborating these complex antigens? It is unlikely that nature put them there just to prevent man from grafting cells onto new hosts. What, then, is the normal function of the antigens that all our cells are constantly producing? Burnet and

others have wondered whether the antigens or self-markers of cells could carry the information that controls the growth of cells. According to this hypothesis, the growth of each cell may be controlled by local and systemic feed back mechanisms that in turn are controlled by the output of self-marker substances. With this possibility in mind, let us review the various means by which normal cells can be changed to cancer cells.

There is a growing belief that many of the known carcinogenic agents exert their carcinogenic action in an indirect rather than direct manner. Thiouracil, for example, is a carcinogen for the thyroid cell, but it exerts its action indirectly by increasing the output of TSH. Radiation of the thyroid is also carcinogenic, but again only indirectly. In a certain strain of mice, radiation of the total body will induce tumors of the thymus, but, as mentioned earlier, it seems to do it in an indirect manner. In all these cases the true carcinogen is neither the exogenous chemical nor the radiation but an endogenous, growth-stimulating substance whose output has been increased.

Sometimes it is difficult to determine whether an apparently stimulating effect is the result of true stimulation or of the release of inhibition. Cells may grow and divide merely because they are released from the factors that restrain their growth. This is the theory of carcinogenesis proposed by Little, who suggests that neoplasia is the result of cells becoming independent of their usual controls so that latent growth energy is released. Review of the factors known to cause cancer suggests that these various carcinogenic agents could exert their effects by interfering with the local controls of cellular growth.

*Behavior of Cells in Tissue Culture and Their Tendency To Undergo Malignant Change*

The study of cells in tissue culture suggests that, sooner or later, the descendants of normal cells that survive in tissue cul-

ture lose function, dedifferentiate, and become cancer cells. Such cells, transplanted back into animals of the same inbred strain, may grow progressively and destroy the host. This is not true of tissue slices or organ cultures in which the balance of the factors that control growth are maintained by the presence of various types of cells. Malignant change is most apt to occur in clones of cells removed from all the restraints that the host normally imposes on cellular growth.

Lack of cohesiveness is one of the distinguishing features of cancer cells and perhaps is a sign that the growth of the cell is no longer under the control of its neighboring cells. The lack of attachment of the cancer cells to their surrounding cells may allow them to grow uncontrolled, as in tissue culture. When normal restraints are removed, it is as though the specialized cell reverts phylogenetically to resemble a remote ancestor—an undifferentiated unicellular organism growing and dividing without restraint.

#### *Physical Carcinogenesis*

The recent experiments of Oppenheimer and associates have established a new way of producing cancer, best named "physical carcinogenesis." If a plastic film or a thin sheet of inert metal is buried for a few months in the subcutaneous tissue of a rat, sarcomas develop in the fibrous pocket made by the foreign body. If many small holes are punched in the film, no sarcomas develop. If the plastic is woven so that there are interstices, no sarcomas develop. In this system, carcinogenesis depends, not on the type nor on the amount of foreign body, but on its size and impermeability. It appears that anything that physically separates the connective-tissue cells from one another releases these cells from the growth-restraining effects of neighboring cells. Each cell that touches the foreign material could be considered to be half-immersed in a tissue culture, for the foreign

material, like a tissue culture, does not afford the normal restraint of growth. The result is malignant change.

#### *Repeated Injury as a Cause of Cancer*

Prolonged ulceration or repeated injury and repair are associated with a tendency to malignant change. The cells at the site of injury or ulceration are in a situation similar to that described above as "physical carcinogenesis." Injury removes cells that normally control the growth of their neighbors so that the side of each cell on the surface of the wound is exposed to a situation in which, as in tissue culture, there are no local or contact controls.

#### *Hormonal Carcinogenesis*

When a trophic hormone stimulates the growth of a target organ, the net result is similar to that produced by putting the target organ's cells in tissue culture—the cells dedifferentiate, increase their rate of growth, and ultimately may undergo malignant change.

The rate of growth of cells in tissue culture appears to be maximal as soon as the cells are removed from local restraints and adjust themselves to the medium. There is as yet no evidence that the growth rate of a target organ's cell in tissue culture is increased by adding a trophic hormone to the medium. It is, therefore, possible that the basic effect of a trophic hormone on a target organ's cell is merely to release it from local restraint. Perhaps it acts by coating the cell's surface, like an antibody, and so preventing the entry of growth-controlling substances or by suppressing the formation of the controlling substances. In either case the cell would be isolated from local restraint and subject to malignant change (Fig. 1).

If cancer were produced by direct effects of radiation on the genetic mechanism of cells, one would expect malignant change

to be evident in skin cells soon after exposure to radiation. This is not the case. The long lag period before cancer develops suggests that an *indirect* mechanism is at work, as in the case of the thyroid. Perhaps radiation inhibits the formation of substances that normally control the growth of skin cells, or it alters the skin cells so that they are no longer susceptible to local controls.

If radiation does exert its carcinogenic effects by releasing cells from local controls, it might seem strange that irradiated skin does not become hyperplastic. Perhaps it would if the




Fig. 1.—Although a trophic hormone appears to stimulate the growth of its target cells, it is possible that this effect is accomplished indirectly by blocking an influence that normally restrains growth. If within each cell there is a growth potential held in check by local controls, removal of these controls would result in cellular growth. The trophic hormone could coat the target cell like an antibody, blocking the action of the restraining influence at point 1, or it could suppress the formation of the restraining influence at point 2.

cells' ability to divide were not impaired by the direct effects of the radiation. In the skin, therefore, the conditions comply with Kaplan's principle of carcinogenesis, that is, that cancer occurs when the cells of a target organ are exposed to a growth stimulus under conditions in which they cannot respond in a normal way.

#### *Chemical Carcinogens*

Some chemical carcinogens, like thiouracil, act indirectly rather than directly on the cell. In the skin, too, there is evidence that carcinogens may exert their effects in an indirect manner. Marchant and Orr painted the skins of animals with chemical carcinogens. Before cancer developed, the carcinogen-treated skin was transplanted to the opposite side of the body. Cancer developed, not in the transplanted skin, but at the site from which the skin had been removed. When the carcinogen-treated site was covered with untreated skin grafts, carcinoma developed in the grafts. Again, an indirect mechanism seems to be responsible for the development of cancer. Perhaps the carcinogen reduces the responsiveness of skin cells to normal controls or acts on adjacent cells to suppress the output of substances that normally control the growth of skin. If the growth of skin cells were released from local controls, the situation would resemble uncontrolled cells in tissue culture, and malignant change might follow.

All the types of carcinogenesis hitherto mentioned can be explained on the basis of release of controls exerted by the body on cell growth. Yet there are some observations on the growth of cells which cannot be so explained and which, in fact, suggest that under certain circumstances the same type of cells may exert a stimulating rather than an inhibiting effect on one another's growth. For example, it is difficult to make a single cell grow in tissue culture, whereas groups of cells may grow

readily. A single cell may grow in a fine capillary tube, where presumably its products can accumulate and further its growth, yet a similar cell will fail to grow when it is introduced into a larger space, where its products become diffuse. A single cell introduced into a tissue culture containing cells sterilized by radiation may survive and reproduce, whereas it could not do so if alone. Apparently a normal cell, and perhaps a tumor cell too, makes products that stimulate its own growth and that of homologous cells. In this connection Klein and Klein have said: "Some of our experiments suggest that a neoplasm originally dependent on a certain stimulation may become independent at the population level but not at the cellular level indicating that the tumor cells themselves may learn to replace some of the functions of the original [trophic] stimulus."

In addition to local humoral restraints, there are complex contact mechanisms and principles of polarity that, especially during embryonic development, affect the growth of cells. One of the most dramatic experiments showing the importance of the local environment on the growth of cells is that performed by Weiss and Andres on chick embryos. Embryonic cells from the neural crest of a pigmented strain of chickens were injected into the blood vessels of an embryo of an unpigmented strain. The pigmented cells localized exactly at their normal site and resulted in a pigmented crest. No pigmented cells were demonstrable elsewhere in the body. This and many other observations on the factors affecting the growth of cells make it clear that at present no single theory or principle can explain all the observations that have been made on the growth of cells.

#### *Viruses and Genes as Carcinogens*

No discussion of carcinogenesis would be complete without allusion to the role of genetics and viruses. Many cancers that occur spontaneously arise in strains that have been bred for

their susceptibility to a certain type of cancer. Whether this susceptibility is dependent on an inbred tendency to cellular mutation or on an inbred endocrine or chemical imbalance that promotes such mutation is not clear. Neither has the role of the virus in inbred strains been clarified. It is possible that a carrier virus that reproduces no more rapidly than the cell it inhabits can enter into the genetic mechanism of the cell and result in what Gross describes as "vertical transmission of malignant change." In short, it has become impossible to differentiate accurately between genes that resemble viruses and viruses that resemble genes. It is entirely possible that, as Stanley suggests, viruses may play a major role in the production of human as well as other animal cancers.

Even though viruses may be responsible for many of the mutations that cause cancer, it is likely that their ability to enter into and alter the genetic mechanism of the cell is dependent upon factors other than their mere presence. In the development of crown gall tumor of plants, for example, malignant change induced by exposure to carcinogens does not take place unless the pith is in a growing phase. In mice, oöphorectomy prevents or retards the development of cancers that arise from the "milk-factor virus." The development of leukemia induced by viral infection can be hastened by exposure of the animals to radiation. It seems that the virus may be an important cofactor in carcinogenesis and that, in certain types of cancer in animals, it may be the chief cause. It also seems likely that infections with viruses are not the sole cause of all malignant change.

#### *Cell Isolation as a Possible Common Denominator*

The importance of the local controls of cellular growth has been emphasized in the foregoing review of carcinogenesis. If



we view a multicellular animal as a colony of highly specialized protozoa in which the growth of the various cellular units is controlled by complex contact and humoral mechanisms, it becomes important to consider the factors that control the proliferation of protozoa. Swann, in an excellent review of the control of cell division, states that, when amoebae are allowed to precipitate out of solution and congregate on the bottom of a vessel, the contact of cells with one another results in a decrease in their rate of proliferation, whereas agitation of the fluid so that the amoebae remain suspended in the medium without contact with one another results in further proliferation.

Swann suggests that, in animals, interference with the contact mechanisms that control cellular growth may result in the production of malignant tumors. "The physical basis of specific adhesion [of one cell to another] is by no means entirely clear," he states, "but it is generally assumed to be a phenomenon of the same general type as enzyme-substrate and antibody-antigen reactions." Swann adds that there are a number of reasons to believe that cell contact and adhesion control not only movement of cells but also their proliferation.

The common denominator of carcinogenesis seems to be a release of cells from the local and contact mechanisms that normally restrain their growth. If adjacent cells lose their ability to control the growth of a cell, uncontrolled growth may ensue. If a cell loses its ability to react normally to the growth-controlling substances made by adjacent cells, uncontrolled growth may ensue. If cells are physically separated from one another, as in tissue culture or in "physical carcinogenesis," uncontrolled growth may ensue. Even the separation of cells that occurs when tissues are stretched acts as a stimulus to growth. Thus, it is possible that it is interference with contact and local mechanisms of control that causes the intracellular changes and the uncontrolled proliferation that characterize the cells of cancer.

Although our understanding of the factors that cause cancer has increased a great deal, the clinical approach to the problems of treatment has changed little. In most cases adequate operations performed as early as possible still seem to afford the best chance of cure. Radiation applied to localized and radiosensitive lesions is often equally successful.

Genuine advances have been made in endocrine control of endocrine-dependent tumors. Chemotherapy is used for a few types of cancer, usually for palliation only. Although immunologic methods of controlling cancer have not yet been very successful, it is possible that in the future this line of attack will be more effective than any of the now established methods.

The most hopeful aspect of the cancer problem is our increasing knowledge of the factors that control differentiation, mutation, and growth. We now recognize the cell's ability to adapt its enzyme system to environmental changes; we recognize that there are factors in embryonic life which regulate cell differentiation; we are beginning to study the interplay of the local and systemic factors that control cellular growth. These advances and an increasing understanding of the genetic mechanism of the normal cell make it likely that soon we shall have better understanding and more effective treatment of cancer.

One of the most promising areas for research is study of the local factors that control normal cellular growth. If the chemical substances that control the growth of each type of cell could be identified and made available, it is likely that they could be used to prevent the development of many cancers and to control the growth of those cancer cells that had not attained true autonomy of growth.

Our thinking about cancer has come a long way. At least we can view it not as a demon to be exorcised but in its true biologic

perspective—as a phenomenon of growth. Progress comes through understanding the ways of nature rather than from trying to bend them to our will. Not until we understand the factors that control the growth of normal cells will the problems of cancer be solved.

# The Intellectual's Clouded Mirror

By

Melvin Seeman

HOW DOES THE INTELLECTUAL  
VIEW HIMSELF? THIS WAS THE  
QUESTION POSED TO COLLEGE  
PROFESSORS. ALMOST TO A MAN,  
THEY SAW THEMSELVES AS  
MEMBERS OF A LOOKED-DOWN-  
UPON MINORITY.

The signs of deep concern about the contemporary position of the intellectual in America are not hard to find.

To be sure, as Merle Curti once stressed in his presidential address to the American Historical Society, anti-intellectualism—in one form or another—has a long history in American life. But in recent years the situation of the intellectual has not resembled the mere continuation of a somewhat consistent and historically routine negativism.

The current sense of urgency regarding the definition of the intellectual's role has found expression in a wide variety of places: from *Time* magazine's alarm about the "wide and un-

*Drawing by Richard Frooman*

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healthy gap" between the American intellectuals and the people to a series of symposiums which have appeared in the *Journal of Social Issues*, in the book edited by Daniel Bell entitled *The New American Right*, and in the thoughtful British journal, *Encounter*.

Yet, in spite of this volume of words, and the talent of those involved, it is still possible to agree with Milton Gordon's remark that "the man of ideas and the arts has rarely been studied seriously as a social type by professional students of society." Whether, as some have argued, this retreat from self-analysis reflects a basic disorder in the scientific study of man is debatable enough; but the fact is clear that the research techniques which have been applied to nearly everyone else—from the hobo to the business elite—have rarely been applied to ourselves.

This is a report on one such study of ourselves, its aim being to determine how intellectuals in the current social climate deal with their identity as intellectuals and, beyond that, to suggest what difference it may make if this identity is handled in different ways.

The empirical base for this report was obtained through relatively unstructured interviews (on the average about one hour in length) with all the assistant professors teaching in the humanities and social science departments of a midwestern university. These interviews were not content-analyzed in any statistical sense but were simply examined for patterns of response.

The total number of persons interviewed was forty. They came, in the number indicated, from the following departments: Economics (7), English (6), German (2), History (4), Law (1), Mathematics (3), Philosophy (4), Political Science (2), Psychology (4), Romance Languages (3), and Sociology-Anthropology (4).

The procedure in the interviews was consistent though not standardized. There was no attempt to get answers to preformed

questions. We engaged, rather, in a conversation regarding a letter which outlined a plan for exploring the situation of the intellectual today. The letter was not mailed; it was read by the respondent at the start of the interview and served in this way as a common stimulus object. The body of the letter, which carried my signature follows:

There is considerable evidence (though debatable evidence, to be sure) that the role of the intellectual has become increasingly problematic in American life. Such evidence includes: (1) the widespread expression of anti-intellectual attitudes; (2) the increasing pressure for conformity in intellectual work; and (3) the typical isolation of the intellectual in community life. These current trends are presumably matters of considerable moment to university people who are uniquely concerned with the social conditions under which intellectual activity is carried forward.

It seems to me that some effort to assess the problem among ourselves is in order; and that such an effort might proceed initially by calling together small, informal groups of faculty members to clarify issues and get an exchange of viewpoints. This letter comes as an invitation to you to participate in one of these discussions on the current situation of the intellectual. The discussion would include four or five other persons from the humanities and social sciences, and would take roughly one hour of your time. Since several discussions are planned, I would consider it part of my responsibility to provide you with some type of analytical summary of the sessions held—in effect, a research report.

*Let me emphasize that the purpose of these discussions is not to canvass possible lines of action, but to achieve a clarification of issues on matters which are clearly controversial.*

Would you indicate whether you wish to be included in the list of discussants by returning this letter to me with the appropriate notation?

The italicized portion of this letter was underlined in the original; but in one-half of the cases a more action-oriented statement was substituted for the underlined portion given

here. The two types of letters were randomly alternated in the interviewing program. In the second version, the underlined sentence read: "*Let me emphasize that the purpose of these discussions is not only to achieve a clarification of issues on matters which are clearly controversial; but also to canvass suitable lines of action.*" The proposed discussions never took place, owing to both the press of time and a certain lack of enthusiasm—a lack which the remainder of this paper may make more understandable.

After the respondent had read the letter, he was encouraged to comment freely on any aspect of it; then each of the three points listed in the first paragraph of the letter was discussed; and, finally, I raised the question, "Do you classify yourself as an intellectual?"

I defined the intellectuals as a group for whom the analysis of ideas in their own right (i.e., for no pragmatic end) is a central occupation. The group I chose to interview was taken as a sample of intellectuals, in spite of the fact that some would surely not qualify on more stringent criteria (e.g., their degree of dedication to the life of the mind or the quality of their intellectual work). The sample is defensible, however, on the ground that by social definition—whether he or his colleagues prefer it or not—the university professor teaching in the humanities or social sciences is probably the prime case of intellectual endeavor (i.e., of non-pragmatic and ideological pursuits). Thus, we are concerned with the self-portrait of those who, by social definition at least, are intellectuals.

In a certain sense the chief finding of this study consisted of a "surprise": the unanticipated discovery of the extent to which these intellectuals use the language and mechanisms of minority status to describe themselves and their situation. It may be suggested that this should have been no surprise—that arguments



quite consistent with this have been advanced in many places. And to some degree that is true.

In an article in *Harper's* (R. L. Bruckberger, "An Assignment for Intellectuals," *Harper's*, CCXII [1956], 69), for example, a French writer had this to say:

It seems to me that the attitude of the American intellectual in comparison with his European counterpart is based on frustration and an inferiority complex. I am continually meeting people who tell me that the intellectual in Europe enjoys a position which, if not happier, is at least more dignified than that of the intellectual in America. . . . Whose fault is this? They go on to tell me that the fault rests with the American people, who have no appreciation for things of the intellect. I wonder whether it is not also in great measure the fault of the American intellectuals themselves.

In a similar vein Riesman and Glazer have commented that "the opinion leaders among the educated classes—the intellectuals and those who take their cues from them—have been silenced more by their own feelings of inadequacy and failure than by direct intimidation." And Marcus Cunliffe, describing the United States intellectual for *Encounter* magazine, concludes: "Altogether, there has been an unfortunate loss of self-respect. Some intellectuals have felt that, wrong about communism, they must be occupationally prone to be wrong about everything."

But the point is that comments of this kind do not constitute evidence; and, indeed it is possible, if one questions the evidence to treat such comments themselves as reflections of a kind of minority-style indictment of one's own group (like the Jew who agrees that "we" are too clanish, the intellectual says that "we" are too weak in will). Furthermore, the comments we have cited do not provide a systematic view of the specific forms of minority language which intellectuals employ in discussing themselves. Our empirical task here is to indicate that such mi-

nority references are surprising, indeed, in their frequency and to make a start toward a categorization of the forms these references take.

The clearest of these forms may be labeled *the direct acceptance of majority stereotypes*. Like the Negroes who have accepted the whites' definition of color and who choose "light" among themselves, our respondents appear eager to validate the outsider's negative view of them. One need only read these forty interview reports to emerge with a collective self-portrait of the soft, snobbish, radical, and eccentric intellectual who is asocial, unreliable, hopelessly academic, and a bit stupid to boot. It is impossible to cite here the evidence for all this; but each of the stereotypes in the previous sentence has a parallel affirmation in the interview material. These affirmations are, to be sure, frequently hedged with restrictions and limitations—we are dealing, after all, with a group of highly trained qualifiers. But the significant thing is that the respondents take this opportunity to affirm the stereotype; and this affirmation is typically set in a context which makes it clear that the stereotype, rather than the qualification, has a competing chance to govern behavior. Let me give some examples:

If there is anti-intellectualism in our community, I feel frankly we are to blame. If we can't throw off our infernal need for preaching and dictating, they have a right to damn us, and we have no human answer but our fallibility.

It's pretty difficult for the intellectual to mix with people. They feel ill at ease. Many intellectuals are not very approachable; perhaps his training is not complete enough. The intellectual may be more to blame for that than anyone else.

My general attitude is that some of the intellectuals are so concerned with academic freedom that it kind of tires me. And, I think, this sometimes adds up to wanting more freedom than anybody else—the kind of freedom to be irresponsible. [And later

when asked whether the letter should include the action alternative, this subject said:] It shouldn't be in there, because basically I think that except in the most long-run sense there is not a thing you can do. Maybe we can breed a new line of professors.

We could go on here, if space permitted, about "the snobbishness we are all guilty of" and about the "queer birds" who "make a profession of being different" and "don't have sense enough to pour sand out of a boot" (these quotations coming from four different respondents). This direct acceptance by intellectuals of the negative stereotype regarding intellectuals follows the pattern of the minority "self-hate" which Kurt Lewin has described in the case of the anti-Semitic Jew and which has been clearly expressed in a study I did on Negro color attitudes. ("Skin Color Values in Three All-Negro School Classes," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. XI [1946].)

A second, and somewhat less extreme, variety of minority attitude may be labeled *the concern with in-group purification*. This label points to language and behavior which are guided by the idea that the minority's troubles are rooted in the misguided ways of a small fraction among them. The parallel with traditional minorities reads: for the Jews, it is the "bad" Jew—the one who is, indeed, aggressive and loud—who breeds anti-Semitism; and, for the intellectuals, it is the radical, asocial types who are responsible for the group's difficulty. Thus, on the radical issue, one respondent, speaking of his effort to establish a research contact downtown, said:

I realized we had one or two strikes against us because we were from the university. We had to have people vouch for us. We don't enjoy the best reputation down there; we're blamed for the actions of a few who make radical speeches and seem to over-generalize.

Another respondent, speaking of an "extreme liberal" in his college, remarked:

I've got nothing against it, but the average man might translate this [liberalism] over to our college. In this sense, he does a slight disservice to the college.

Similarly, on scores other than radicalism there are expressions of the view that the position of the intellectuals turns on the "impure" behavior of the intellectual himself. One respondent, discussing anti-intellectualism in general, remarked that we could lick the problem:

If we had people getting out and who really did mix, as speakers and members. . . . I've worried about this: would I be willing to to be in an organization if I were only a member? We get to be president and vice-president all the time. It doesn't do any good to be in and be officers; in order to get over the thought of us as intellectual snobs, we have to be satisfied to be just members.

This quotation highlights one interesting result of this concern with the "impure"—and a result which, again, has a clear minority flavor. The intellectual becomes involved in the need to prove that the impurity really is not there (or, at the very least, that the intellectual in question is not one of the "impure" few). We are familiar with the Jewish person who is inordinately careful to demonstrate in his own behavior that Jews as a group are not what the stereotype says; and Anatole Broyard has nicely described the various forms that Negro "inauthenticity" of the same type may take (e.g., what he calls "role inversion" is a careful and extreme negation of precisely those qualities embodied in the Negro stereotype—"cool" music and passive behavior, for example, being a negation of the primitive, hot, carefree quality in the Negro stereotype).

The interviews reveal a similar concern with disproving the stereotype. Thus, one respondent, discussing possible action alternatives, commented:

We could, of course, go out and make talks to various groups—show them that intellectuals really aren't bad guys.

Another, speaking about the isolation of the intellectual, said:

Well, in neighborhood isolation, there's a lot of it due to their initial reaction—when they find out you're a professor they slightly withdraw, but, if you continue to make connections, then they find out you're a human being.

Still another person commented:

If we mixed more, and became known as people as well as college teachers, maybe it would be better. Frequently, the antipathy to college teachers melts when they meet you personally; though we do have a tendency to carry our classroom personality into other areas.

A third major category of minority-like response may be titled *the approval of conformity*. In a certain sense, of course, the pattern just described is a specialized form of conformity; for its main aim is to emphasize the conventional as against the divergent aspects of the intellectual's behavior. But the pressure for conformity goes beyond this. It involves the same kind of passive, conservative, and attention-avoiding behavior that Lewin has described as prototypical for minority leaders, his "leaders from the periphery." And, in the long run, this pressure for conformity leads to assimilationism—to the very denial of any significant observable differences on which minority status may rest. As far as the more traditional minorities are concerned, the classic T. W. Adorno volume [*The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950)] on prejudice and personality has put one part of the conformist case as follows:

Since acceptance of what is like oneself and rejection of what is different is one feature of the prejudiced outlook [i.e., of the authoritarian personality], it may be that members of minority

groups can in limited situations and for some period of time protect themselves and gain certain advantages by conforming in outward appearance as best they can with the prevailing ways of the dominant group.

As with these minorities, we find that there is considerable commitment to conformity among intellectuals and that this is expressed variously as a need to adjust, to avoid controversy, or to assimilate and deny differences entirely. Thus, one respondent, discussing the conformity question raised in the letter, said:

On that I can't say I've experienced it. I'm in a pretty safe field. . . . [He then described a book of readings he had collected and said that there was a short passage from a well-known writer which had been taken out before publication.] There's no use stirring up trouble. I don't think it was a lack of courage on my part. We thought—that is, the editor and I—that it was too touchy. It's a very beautiful thing, but we took it out.

Another individual, discussing the community life of the intellectual, noted that they often do not take an active part and added:

Part of that is good, in that they are lending the prestige of the university when they do take part, and shouldn't be doing that. I don't want to be written up in the paper as Professor X of university holding a certain opinion. I've deliberately refrained from expressing political opinion.

Still others appear to argue for conformity by denying that there is a difference to which the notion of "intellectual" points:

I don't feel any different from my electrician-neighbor.

I get a kind of inferiority complex if they call me "professor"; I know that my work with the intellect is on the same level in the eyes of the man in the street as, say, a chain-store manager.

Or else there is insistence that it is important for the intellectual

to assimilate or disguise himself more successfully. Thus, one respondent, speaking of occasions when he makes public addresses, said:

When I go out and meet these people, I try to fit myself into their realm, into the climate of the various groups.

Another gave, as part of his recipe for the intellectual's behavior, the directive:

He should adjust his personality so he can mix in better with the person who isn't an intellectual.

And one I have quoted before, speaking of the intellectual's isolation in community life, said:

You must make concessions. I would find it pretty hard to have contacts, for example, in places like Wilder's *Our Town* or Anderson's small Ohio town, but I couldn't accuse the people in the town of being anti-intellectual; it's probably my fault. If you make a certain amount of concession, you will find a way.

There are other comments which are less clear in their conformist implications—for example, more than faintly guilty remarks to the effect that "my neighbors see me home in the early afternoon and wonder just what it is I do in my job." On the whole, there is considerable evidence in these protocols that the typical minority response of conformity is found in a variety of forms among intellectuals.

The fourth category of response represents the extreme of minority assimilation from the standpoint of the individual, namely, *the denial of group membership*. Like the name-changing Jew and the Negro who "passes," many intellectuals find means to hide or escape their unwelcome identity. An interviewee nicely described this pattern as follows:

One consequence of anti-intellectualism is for some intellectuals to deny that they are intellectuals. This is a behavioral denial; its

part of the psychological revolution, the adjustment trend. . . . The pressure to be well-adjusted is high, and so he becomes non-intellectual and begins to deny in some respects that he is an intellectual.

The evidence in the interviews indicates that the retreat from membership is a substantial one and takes many forms. Indeed, one of the real surprises, during the course of these interviews, was the rarity of real acceptance of intellectual status. This non-acceptance is revealed in several ways. First, there is the frequency with which this freely offered remark appears: "Intellectuals, I hate the word!" Second, there are the direct denials to the question, "Do you consider yourself an intellectual?" A complete listing of the protocol responses on this point would reveal a quite consistent, though subtly varied, pattern of maneuvering, all aimed at being counted out—the kind of "Who, me?" response one gets from the obviously guilty. Thus, one respondent said:

That's a word that always does bother me. I don't think of myself so. It's a self-conscious word that sets us apart from the rest of the population. The only thing that sets us apart, in fact, is that we have gone to school longer than some, and there are doctors who have gone longer and we don't consider them intellectuals.

Another said:

I don't apply it to myself. I never use it myself. It's sort of snobbish.

And still another:

I would [use the designation "intellectual"] in the professional sense only. . . . Professionally, I suppose we can't avoid it. Only in the very narrow professional sense, in the sense that we are trying to improve the intellect of students, I suppose it applies. I don't see how a university professor can escape the narrow meaning of the term.



And, finally, one respondent clearly recognized the social definition of himself yet reflected no eagerness in his personal definition:

I suppose I would [consider myself an intellectual]. . . . I don't know if I am twenty-four hours a day, but still I suppose my work would be classified or considered as intellectual. . . . I teach the best I can, and certainly I'm classified as an intellectual by the community, my neighbors, and my colleagues.

A third kind of denial of membership is shown in the efforts that are made to avoid having one's affiliation publicly known. Thus, one respondent said:

When I'm away from the university, I usually have plenty of dirt under my nails, or I'm getting a harvest. Some of us fool ourselves into believing that the stain of our profession doesn't follow us. I can work with a carpenter for several weeks, and he has no notion I'm a university professor. I take a foolish pride, I suppose, in this.

Another remarked:

By training we get so we show contempt for those who overgeneralize, as in the Rotary, and we don't want to be in arguments all the time so we stay away. And how often do we go out of the way to announce that we're college professors. I don't conceal it; but I don't volunteer it. It would change your relation to the group.

Thus, in one way or another, many of our respondents indicate that they do not cherish either their name or their identity as intellectuals; and they adopt a language of evasion and anonymity which is minority-like, indeed. Though one may argue that this rejection of the name is not, after all, so terribly important, it seems to me more reasonable, in this case, to see the "naming trouble" as an essential part of the status involved.

The fifth, and last, category of minority-like response can be designated *the fear of group solidarity*. This label indicates behavior whose essential function is similar to the conformist response; namely, behavior calculated to keep the majority's attention off the minority as such. In our intellectuals this typically takes the form of strong resistance to any clearly identifiable group action on the group's problems; the answer lies, rather, in individual goodness. One respondent, in fact, while stating the case against group action, made the minority tie himself:

The notion of action involves the whole place of the intellectual in society. In addition, direct action put us in the position of special pleading. It's like a Jew going out and talking about anti-Semitism.

Another said:

Individual action seems more feasible. One has to measure one's forces and deploy them properly. . . . If you try to organize a society for X, Y, or Z, and you have the right people on the letterhead, maybe you're O.K.; but otherwise you're considered radical. Many things can be carried out without anybody knowing there is an organization.

Still another remarked:

I'm frankly very much afraid of any action that has the label of the organized action of the intellectuals—not afraid of what they might do, but of public reaction. It ought to be unorganized.

Many of those interviewed seem committed to "having an effect the individual way" and are against "forming an organization that's militant." They wish, in a certain sense, to be (as one respondent described himself) "the kind of social actionist who never appears to be one." I am interested here not in asserting that the strategy of organizational effort is a sounder strategy

but in noting that the arguments against it frequently reflect a desire—common in other minorities—not to become too visible or too aggressive in one's own interest.

Neither the quotations nor the categories given above exhaust the minority language in these interviews. Moreover, I have intentionally failed to analyze or report in any fulness the more "positive" remarks on the intellectual's role in society or on the anti-intellectualism within university life itself (as one person put it: "the destruction of the intellectual community within the university"). It was, in fact, only after the interviews were almost completed, and the variability in self-definition became ever more striking, that it was clear we might treat intellectual status directly, as one which presents a standard problem in minority adjustment.

I have argued elsewhere that marginalities of this kind provide the opportunity for the development of perspective and creativity—an opportunity whose realization depends upon the adjustment which is made to marginal status. In this earlier study, using the Jews as a case in point, I found that favorable adjustment to marginality was, indeed, associated with what was called "intellectual perspective"; and it now seemed possible to apply the same general logic to this sample of intellectuals.

Certainly, many have asserted that there is an inherent alienative potential—an inescapable degree of marginality—in the intellectual role; and the assertion usually follows that the individual's style of adjustment to this marginality affects his performance as an intellectual. The usual view, of course, is that those who are "frozen" by this marginality and who retreat into conformity are less creative as intellectuals. Cunliffe, writing in *Encounter*, almost incidentally, makes this tie between mode of adjustment and creativity in advancing his distinction

between two types of American intellectuals, whom he calls the "*avant-garde*" and the "*clerisy*":

So, if there have been many alienated Western intellectuals since 1800, whom I will label the *avant-garde*, there have also been others [the "*clerisy*"], of similar intellectual weight, though as a rule of less creative brilliance, who have remained more or less attached to their society.

The discovery, in the interviews, of so many and so varied responses to this marginal aspect of the intellectual's position suggested the possibility of testing, in a small-scale empirical way, such common assertions about the consequences (or correlates) of the intellectual's adjustment to marginality. The hypothesis tested paralleled that given in the earlier paper on the Jews as a minority; namely, that those intellectuals who have successfully adjusted to the marginal character of their role—those who, let us say, reveal a minimum of our five minority-style attitudes toward themselves as intellectuals—would be, in turn, the more creative workers in their respective crafts. Despite the obvious limitations of so small a sample, our results were statistically significant and the trend clear—the more adjusted the respondent was to his role as an intellectual, the more creative he tended to be, as judged by his colleagues. However, I do not take this as an unequivocal demonstration of the hypothesis in question. For one thing, there are other variables of considerable relevance (e.g., the age of the respondent) that cannot be controlled adequately in a sample of this size; and, in addition, questions remain open about the reliability of the adjustment ratings.

It is customary, of course, to conclude by noting the need for further research—in this case, research on the forms and consequences of anti-intellectualism. But there is one crucial thing: To find, as we have, that many intellectuals adopt, with-

out serious efforts to build a reasoned self-portrait, an essentially negative, minority view of themselves and to find, in addition, some plausible ground for believing that this failure in self-conception is not independent of role performance—gives a special cast to the usual call for research. Thus it would seem essential to recognize that this research must include, if we may call it that, an “inward” as well as an “outward” orientation—that is, we must presumably conduct two related research operations: a study of the attitudes that others take toward intellectuals as well as a more intensive study of the intellectuals’ attitudes toward themselves. A serious effort along those lines might yield considerably more than the usual research project; it can become an opportunity for self-discovery.

# How We Might Win the Hot War and Lose the Cold

By Charles E. Osgood

*A psychologist examines the  
"real" war with communism  
and wonders:*




*Why not consider unilateral arms  
suspension—crazy though it sounds?*

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*When do we stop letting others manipulate us by simply applying the right stimuli to our foreign policy?*

*Is it better to be wiped out, or to be alive as a conquered subject?*



*When do we start cutting the Russian bogeyman down to size?*



We are close to the point where either of the two major powers in the world today will be capable of wiping out the other in almost less time than it takes to read this article. We are faced with the potentially lethal combination of armaments against which there is no defense and tensions from which there seems

to be no respite. Given a world system of competing sovereign states, this combination makes probable the end of civilization as we know it and at least possible the elimination of life on this planet.

This grim assessment of our situation is the consensus of men who have thought and written about problems of policy in the nuclear age, regardless of their role in our society.

#### NATURE OF THE REAL CONFLICT WITH RUSSIA AND COMMUNISM

Most people think of "war" in terms of soldiers and guns, military victories and defeats, destruction and death wreaked by each side on the other—in short, "war" means the resort to force as a means of resolving international conflict. In this sense of the term, we are in danger of becoming involved in a war *with Russia*. But this is a narrow conception of conflict between human groups and one that is not even held by all military men (e.g., S. King-Hall). A broader conception of "war" is that it is an attempt to change the system of beliefs held by some other group of people, when these beliefs conflict with one's own and particularly when they engender behaviors which threaten one's own security. This conception is implicit in the phrase "cold war," and it widens considerably the choice of weapons and strategies. Infiltration and subversion become strategies of war, as does the alignment of a favorable balance of power. If we can change the ideology of an enemy by educating him, this too becomes a strategy of war in this broad sense. From this point of view we are now "at war" *with communism*—but equally with other totalitarian systems—and we have been "at war" for a long, long time.

Just what are we fighting for in this war with communism? What is it that we wish to gain, to defend, to maintain? Cer-



tainly, we have no expansionist ambitions in Europe or Asia, nor do we wish to annihilate human beings on other portions of the globe. *We are fighting to preserve a way of life*, a system of beliefs, an ideology, if you will. Stripped to its essentials, this way of life is one in which the state is subservient to the individuals who compose it. All the things which dominantly characterize our way of life—a democratic form of government, a capitalistic economic system, a legal system which guarantees the rights of individuals to education and freedom of expression—flow from this pervasive underlying notion.

The basic philosophy of communism, as I understand it, is quite the reverse of this. In essence, it is that the individuals who compose the state are subservient to it. The individual has no "rights"—to dissent, to be educated, to be informed, to compete for a share in the economy equal to his ability and effort—except insofar as serving the best interests of the state (defined by others than himself) may be considered a right. Such a way of life is repugnant and intolerable to people who have known an alternative (and I believe becomes so to those who have not, as they acquire education and economic security). If it can be agreed that we are fighting to preserve a social philosophy in which the state is subservient to the individuals who compose it, *then one criterion in evaluating any policy, in selecting any strategy, in our war with communism must be that it serve to support our way of life.*

There are case-hardened statesmen who will think that the nature of our conflict with communism lies primarily in disagreement over who is to control great and important areas between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., rather than in any question as to the preservation of our way of life here in this country.

There are also many well-disciplined political scientists who will say that the underlying source of international tensions is still, as it always has been, the struggle for power, and in this

struggle weapons are simply instruments for effecting a change in the balance of power—whether the weapons be clubs or atomic warheads. Admitting the risk of alienating some readers, I will nevertheless dub this “The Neanderthal Conception of International Relations.” Even though the manifest behaviors of nations may often conform to this image, I suspect that the Neanderthalic bluster nearly always has masked a deeper anxiety. Analysis of the dynamics behind international relations certainly indicates that another major source of tensions is *mutual insecurity*. Today, perhaps more than ever before, elite groups accept national security as a primary responsibility and base decisions upon it rather than upon national aggrandizement or power-seeking per se. No one really wants war on present terms, but no one seems able to avoid an inevitable spiraling toward it.

The availability of nuclear weapons with awesome capacities for destruction, to say nothing about biological weapons, may not alter the nature of the real conflict or its goals, but it certainly must change radically the weights we use in evaluating alternative strategies. It is axiomatic in utility theory that, as the punishment for error goes up, the odds at which risk will be taken also go up. Therefore, *a second criterion in evaluating policies must be the extent to which they reduce the threat to our survival.*

I take the physicists at their word when they say there is no adequate military defense against nuclear attack. I am vaguely impressed when I read in the National Planning Association's Report, entitled *1970 without Arms Control*, that “one thermonuclear bomb in the low megaton range releases more destructive energy than that released by all of the bombs dropped on Germany and Japan during World War II.” But somehow words do not have the impact of events they represent. I am

sure that one ordinary atomic bomb dropped on New York City, with complete television coverage, would do more to convince us of the utter horror of nuclear war than all the statistics one could amass.

#### AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT POLICY ALTERNATIVES

##### *Preventive War*

There are several requirements for this to be a feasible solution. In the first place, one side must gain a *sufficient* lead over the other in the armament race so as to reduce the probability of punishing reprisal to a level where the risk will be taken. Since the cost of an error is so high, what constitutes a "sufficient" lead would probably be considerable. However, the "lead" need not be in terms either of new types of armament or the amassing of sheer amounts of armament. The combination of an effective method of infiltration into enemy retaliation centers along with a supply of "pocket-size" nuclear bombs could provide the sufficient lead. In the second place, it is obvious that a preventive war of this sort must begin (and probably end) with a *surprise attack*. This means that the preparations must be secret, and they must be known only to a small minority of the population. The decision for preventive war in the nuclear age cannot, therefore, be arrived at through ordinary democratic processes. The government, or clique within a government, that decides on this course must assume that the people it represents are morally, emotionally, and attitudinally prepared for such an act—or it must be completely insensitive to the reactions of the populace.

This strategy is, therefore, more feasible for a totalitarian government than a democratic government. It has also been argued that American ideology is incompatible with launching a preventive war. Certainly, we did not take the opportunity we

apparently had against Russia immediately following the collapse of Germany and Japan.

Even if the United States were to adopt this strategy at some future time, it is hard to see how this would achieve victory in the real war as I have defined it. Not only would the launching of a surprise attack of necessity constitute a lapse of our beliefs and values, but it would put us in the position of being the major threat in the eyes of the rest of the world. Hence we ourselves would be under continuous threat of surprise attack and would be forced to exhaust ourselves in policing the globe—or forced to secure our “way of life” by systematically exterminating competition. One cannot imagine our system of government surviving under such conditions. On all counts, then—feasibility, eliminating the threat of nuclear war, and achieving our real goal—this strategy fails.

#### *Mutual Deterrence*

The dominant theme in American international policy has been “peace through strength.” The basic idea is that the only way to secure peace in a threatening and unstable world is to make one’s self so powerful that no single enemy or combination of enemies would dare to attack.

It is clear, in the first place, that this is not a situation designed to produce feelings of security on either side. There is no elimination of the threat of nuclear destruction and all that it entails in the way of personal human suffering; quite the opposite, it is this mutual threat that is supposed to guarantee peace. Responsible individuals on both sides, in government, in the military, in science, feel themselves to be “walking on atomic eggs.” The consequences of a mistake, of an error in judgment, become incalculable. Furthermore, it is difficult to maintain just the right degree of threat—not so little that the enemy is encouraged to aggress through confidence and not so much that he is encouraged to aggress through fear.

The responses to such a situation of insecurity, anxiety, and conflict are complex and varied, but they are all designed to reduce these unpleasant states. One response is to support demands for research, development, and stockpiling of new and better armaments. But every step that serves to decrease insecurity at home serves to increase insecurity abroad. Thus we see that the policy of mutual deterrence through fear of retaliation leads inevitably to an armament race.

In the second place we must ask if this policy is a feasible one for the United States. By "feasible" in this case I mean is the United States likely to be able to maintain a favorable balance on the progressively expanding seesaw of an armament race with the Soviet Union? In my own attempt to weigh this question objectively I have come to the somber conclusion that we would be very likely to lose in such a competition. Ours is a smaller nation in terms of both area and manpower; our natural resources have been much more fully utilized to date than those of the Soviet Union; our traditional isolation by virtue of the two oceans which separate us from potential enemies has lost its significance in an age of ballistic missiles.

But the biggest factor leading me to this conclusion is the difference in our "ways of life." The totalitarian system seems better able to wage a war on these terms than a democratic system: Where the Communists have been able to channel the energies of their people into military preparations at the expense of civilian needs and comforts, we have been trying to maintain both a massive military establishment and the luxurious, civilian economy depicted by Madison Avenue. Where the Communists have been able to order the majority of their young people into mathematics, engineering, and physical sciences, our democratic system demands that young people be allowed to choose their own careers—and most of them choose careers in the business world where our free economy

provides the largest rewards. Where the Communists are able to make quick decisions and changes in policy without continuous reference to the will of the people, democratic systems require the consent of the governed (even if indirectly through an intricate pattern of checks and balances among their representatives) and, therefore, display a greater inertia in both launching new policy and terminating old.

If I am right, then, pursuing the policy of deterrence successfully will require us to give up as rapidly as possible a system of beliefs which ill fits us for this kind of competition.

The signs of erosion in our way of life are already becoming apparent: Maintaining deterrent pressure demands a unified front in the eyes of the enemy, so the very diversity of opinion on which democracy thrives becomes dangerous (and we find a president accusing a senator of, in effect, aiding the enemy by publicly disagreeing with our policy in East Asia). An arms race demands secrecy, so the information citizens need to make intelligent decisions is kept from them (and newspaper reporters try in vain to pierce the fog of secrecy). Maintaining our balance on the slippery seesaw demands quick decisions and commitments, so we find increasing pressures being brought to sidestep the democratic process in determining policy (and policy-executing agencies like the military and the AEC assume policy-making roles to greater and greater extents).

Some will argue that it has always been necessary to give up our freedoms in time of war so that in the long run they may be preserved. But, not only does the basic conflict with totalitarian systems have no definite conclusion, *the policy of mutual deterrence includes no provisions for its own resolution.* Few people seem to have asked the obvious next question: When and how does it end? Prolonged subjection to a totalitarian set of beliefs, particularly if self-imposed, would probably result in a distortion of our own social philosophy.

But we are considering only the effects within—what about the effects of this policy elsewhere? The usual argument has been that the Communist system will somehow naturally crack if the stalemate persists long enough. The conditions under which human individuals are willing to forfeit their rights, are willing to forego both physical luxuries and intellectual freedoms, are those in which they perceive an overwhelming external threat that requires them to band together for security. The policy of deterrence through fear of retaliation maintains just such conditions. In other words, this policy fosters the very conditions, both in the United States and in Russia, which support the totalitarian way of life. In the very basic sense, then, this is a weapon turned against ourselves.

There are also two very potent sources of uncertainty for both sides in maintaining the delicate balance of retaliatory capacity. The first is the dispersion of nuclear weapons to other nations (the "Nth Country Problem"). It is estimated that by 1960 four powers, and by 1970 at least ten powers, will have nuclear weapons—unless controls are instituted.

The second source of uncertainty is the unpredictability of human behavior under stress. The entire notion of deterrence as a means of preserving peace is predicated on the assumption of rationality on both sides. But, as the speed of delivery of missiles (e.g., from satellite bases) increases, the response time for military retaliation decreases; and, as retaliation response time decreases, so does the time available for rational thought and considered action. There must be dispersion of decision-making away from central authority toward more and more people whose fingers are closer to the "buttons" that must be pressed, and this increases the chance that someone will be psychologically unstable (irrational). Furthermore, we must accept the fact that there are people with suicidal tendencies



who, in destroying themselves, have no compunctions about destroying others.

The final degradation of human intelligence and surrender of our capacity to decide our own fate is to be found in proposals for "a push-button for the dead man's hand." Since a surprise attack could well wipe out a major portion of defending personnel, the argument goes, we must provide automatic devices that will react to blast, heat, or radiation levels and release our own retaliation.

Massive retaliation is clearly a strategy to be employed only as the last resort. Only if our own heartland were endangered, only if our very survival were threatened, would we be willing to let loose such a holocaust. Both our allies and our enemies know this—the former finding little comfort in it and the latter little immediate threat. Therefore, it is completely unwieldy as an instrument for dealing with the everyday skirmishes of foreign policy that have less than survival significance.

#### *Limited War*

The complete failure of massive retaliation to provide a workable framework for foreign policy has led people to search for ways of reducing the dangers in ordinary wars. Proposals usually take either of two forms: (a) complete elimination of the use of all nuclear weapons; (b) elimination of strategic ("saturation") nuclear weapons but use of tactical nuclear weapons. The first version assumes that adequate mutual agreements and inspection systems can be arrived at under present conditions. The second version is essentially the plan advanced by Henry A. Kissinger, and it assumes that international conflicts can be conducted as "gentlemanly wars" in which certain codes of conduct will be adhered to by the military and in which adequate, but not "survival state," morale will be maintained by civilians.



In the first place, it is clear that as long as strategic nuclear weapons are available and stockpiled, even though there may be explicit or implicit agreement not to use them, there always exists the *threat* of their use. Therefore, the Kissinger Plan cannot be said to eliminate the danger of nuclear destruction. In fact, it is the presence of massive retaliatory capacity in the background that is supposed to provide the graduated deterrence to keep wars localized—the very horror of full-scale nuclear war is supposed to prevent antagonists from unleashing it. But, by the very same reasoning, this same horror already should have led us to nuclear disarmament, promptly agreed to by all sides—yet it obviously has not.

The particular danger in the limited-war conception is that the attitudes and emotions generated in wartime—identification with allies, involvement with far-flung outposts, frustrations of a war economy, injury and death of loved ones—operate to make surrender or even compromise psychologically intolerable. Even though a conflict might begin as a localized affair, waged with conventional weapons, each side soon finds good reasons to increase the violence of its attack.

Proponents of the Kissinger Plan see it as a strategy which permits us to use war as an instrument of foreign policy, enabling us to protect the free world by countering aggression wherever it may occur. The use of tactical nuclear weapons is considered advantageous for the United States because it substitutes highly mobile firepower for sheer manpower. How valid are these premises? In the first place, we can expect an enemy to cancel out quickly the advantage of tactical nuclear weapons with similar devices of his own. Second, one can understand why countries being “protected” might take a dim view of being the sites of localized devastation, since the whole concept of limited war is to keep conflicts localized elsewhere than in the heartlands of the two major powers.

Finally, there is the whole question of the feasibility of "gentlemanly wars." However appealing this concept may be to military men, it seems entirely incompatible with the conditions under which wars are fought today. Modern ideological wars are waged by whole populations, not by a few champions following rigid codes of honor. Victories and defeats are viewed passionately, not with the indifference of peasants watching a medieval tournament.


#### *Mutual Disarmament*

Whatever the dominant policy in practice may be, our sincere hope is to secure mutual agreements leading to progressive disarmament. If disarmament included nuclear weapons, there is no question but what the threat of destruction would be at least temporarily eliminated, thus satisfying one of our main criteria. This policy would also foster conditions which favor our way of life, and hence would contribute to victory in the basic conflict with communism. But the problem here is feasibility.

Negotiations for disarmament are usually instigated by anxiety—anxiety created mutually by more aggressive measures. Thus it follows that such negotiations are characteristically entered into at times when tensions are already running high, and both sides bring to the conference table precisely those attitudes which generated the tensions and the arms race to begin with. Yet success of the policy requires an awareness of the greater threat, a trust in the essential humanity of the enemy, and hence a willingness to compromise. As Bertrand Russell has so wisely (but I think naïvely) said, it requires both sides to accept a course in which neither gains and neither loses. Let us look more closely into the dynamics of this situation.

Human perceptions are easily influenced by previous conditioning, by existing attitudes, by dominant motives. If the

larger of two moving dots on a screen is shown behind the smaller, it is perceived as "chasing" the little one; if the larger is shown in front of the smaller, it is "leading" the little one (but rarely being chased!)—our previous experience with size in interpersonal relations influences our perception of this neutral event. The objectively impassive face of a man in a picket line looks "threatening" to a representative of management but "determined" to a representative of labor—their attitudes toward him differ. Similarly, the same American military bases in Europe that we see as "defensive" (and hence peaceful) the Russians see as "offensive" (and hence threatening). Elsewhere I have summarized a great deal of experimental evidence which shows how momentary motives affect our interpretation of both words and events. Men who have just experienced failure become sensitized to words signifying failure; hungry men are prone to perceive food objects where there are none; ambiguous words are given interpretations that suit one's purposes and expectations. During Khrushchev's recent visit to this country, many instances of such misinterpretation occurred—some quite funny and some not so funny.



One experimental demonstration of perceptual bias in which I myself participated many years ago seems particularly relevant here. Two bars of light arranged in the shape of an X (see the accompanying figures) are illuminated in rapid alternation, so that what the observer sees is a single bar rotating

from one position to the other—the familiar “phi phenomenon” used in animated neon signs. Now, if the two crossing bars are aligned at right angles to each other (Fig. A) when the observer first sees them, he will be about equally likely to perceive either a “rocking” or a “teetering” motion. If they are originally aligned in the vertical plane (Fig. B), he will always see “rocking”; if they are originally aligned in the horizontal plane (Fig. C), he will always see “teetering”—in other words, the apparent movement ordinarily tends to occur over the shortest distance between lights. But now suppose we start the observer with the bars in position (B) and, while he keeps watching, we gradually shift the bars through the point of objective equality and into position (C). Rather than change his mode of perception, the observer will persist in seeing the original “rocking” movement far beyond the point of objective equality, more and more wildly “rocking” (D), until suddenly, at some point of gross inequality, it breaks into a mild, normal “teetering.”

Now what has all this to do with disarmament negotiations? It provides a scientific basis for one of the major dynamics operating in such negotiations, what I shall call the *biased perception of what is equable*. We can confidently expect that negotiators for both sides, to the extent that they reflect in their own nervous systems the dominant attitudes, beliefs, and motives of their publics—and certainly the publics themselves, as they both react and contribute to the content of the mass media—will enter negotiations with reciprocal biases. Hence what one group of “observers” perceives as equable (fair, balanced, just) must necessarily be perceived by the other as inequable (unfair, unbalanced, unjust), and vice versa. Bertrand Russell’s rule—that both sides must accept a course in which neither gains and neither loses—may be logical, but it is not psychological. For both sides to agree to

ban the use of nuclear weapons as a first step seems eminently fair in the Soviet frame of reference, but it seems eminently unfair in the American frame of reference—and vice versa for the maintenance of American bases in Europe.

Truly equable adjustments would probably be ones that both sides see as somewhat favorable to the other—but this is a psychologically uncomfortable viewpoint, and I cannot see it being adopted except where the costs are slight. Most importantly, we also know from laboratory studies that, as the motivation level of the observer increases, as he becomes more hungry, more angry, or more anxious, his ways of perceiving and interpreting things become even more rigid and inflexible.

Finally, we cannot expect nations and their negotiators to give up overnight their habits of "one-upsmanship"—the belief that a successful compromise is one where our side comes out on top—or their expectation that the other side is playing the same game. This brings us to the second major dynamism that works against successful negotiations, what has been called the *self-fulfilling prophecy*. Negotiators from both sides approach disarmament discussions with the conviction that the other will prove obdurate, unreasonable, and entirely self-interested. Prior to each conference, the press in each nation warns its readers to expect the worst—after all, what can you expect from a treacherous enemy? Each group believes the other is really using the negotiations to gain an edge in the cold war (which, of course, they do when nothing else results from the parley). Believing these things, each side behaves so as to "win" in the competition, little or nothing is achieved, and both sides say, "I told you so." The prophecy has been fulfilled, and each fulfilment reinforces the premise about the other side that will set the stage for the next negotiation.

*Social Relativity*

"Man is the measure of all things," it has been said—but this is true, I think, only to the extent that his science is primitive. One can trace in the development of science a progressive freeing of man's measurements or observations from the arbitrary "platform" of his own senses. Copernicus removed our planet from the center of the conceptual universe; Darwin removed our species from the center of God's creative intentions; Freud removed man's reason from an exclusive role in determining his behavior. Our social measurements are also made relative to our own "position" as an observer. The frame of reference within which we make judgments, the "zero points" of our scales of judgment, are determined by a sort of averaging over our own individual ranges of experience. What is "big" for the child may be "little" for the adult.

I think that one can describe at least three stages in clear social thinking—or in "becoming civilized," if you will. At the simplest, most primitive stage we *unconsciously project our own frame of reference onto others*. Since ego assumes alter to be using the same reference points as he is, it follows that when alter sees as straight what to ego is obviously crooked, when he judges to be tasteless what to ego is obviously tasty, and so on, he must be deliberately "malingering," must be "evil" in some sense, or perhaps "sick" or "abnormal."

The second stage is where we *recognize the relativistic nature of alter's frame of reference but not our own*. This produces a more humanitarian approach to social problems, a "Forgive them for they know not what they do" attitude. This is the level of understanding at which we account for disapproved behavior in others as being due to the conditions under which they happened to develop. Thus members of minority groups

are "pushy," "aggressive," or "immoral" because they grew up in an atmosphere of prejudice or without as much education as we have had.

The third stage, and one that is arrived at with great difficulty and maintained with even greater difficulty, is where we realize the equally relativistic nature of our own frame of reference. Here ego seeks to understand the nature and location of his own "platform" as well as that of alter. This is the parent who is able to see that maybe his own idea of how high up the trousers "look right" is essentially arbitrary. This is the visitor to a foreign country who realizes that his own neutral points on the clean-dirty scale, or the tasty-distasteful scale, or the moral-immoral scale are no more "natural" than anyone else's. And this is also the student of international affairs who sees our own strategies and policies to be as relative to our experience as the enemy's are to his.

#### *Psycho-logic*

During recent years considerable experimental information about the dynamics of attitude formation and change has been gathered. Much of it adds up to what we have known all along as "the consistency of little minds." Human beings generally seem to react to events which do not fit their expectations, to propositions that are inconsistent with their existing attitudes, with mental adjustments designed to maintain as simple and stable a structure as possible. Thus, if we like Ike, and he praises Mr. So-and-so, about whom we know little or nothing, Mr. So-and-so tends to rise in our estimation (it is attitudinally congruent for us to favor things favored by people we like). Conversely, if the Chinese Reds, whom we view with distrust, are in favor of "village communes," about which we know almost nothing, "village communes" acquire a distinctly unfavorable tone (it is congruent for us to dislike things that

people we dislike are in favor of). Each of us has a set of highly intense values—concerning our family, our nation, our religion, our profession, and so on—and these serve as anchor points in our frame of reference, exerting a pushing-pulling effect upon all other ideas we encounter in various kinds of communications.

What results is a kind of “psycho-logic” (I have borrowed this apt term from Drs. R. P. Abelson and M. J. Rosenberg) to which we are all susceptible to some degree—particularly when we are emotional, are not alert, or are dealing with matters outside our areas of special training. It was not logical, but it was psycho-logical, for married women to vote against Adlai Stevenson because he was divorced; it is not logical for us to conclude that a man who beats his wife is a worse poet therefore, but it is psycho-logic; it is psycho-logic rather than logic that leads us to conclude that Nehru is pro-communist because he insists on India’s neutrality. The psycho-logic of human minds, seeking simple black-and-white consistencies in a complex world, runs rampant when we try to come to grips with problems of international conflict. Nevertheless we should try to separate the logical from the psycho-logical as best we can.

#### *Perspective*

It proves helpful for me, at least, to back off from our problem once in a while to try to view it within a larger chunk of both time and space. It is an easy feat for modern telescopes to take us out to a neighboring galaxy, perhaps a few hundred thousand light-years away. Now it may well be that in the light we receive from this system is included the visible effects of great wars, waged by great races, on even greater planets than our own—yet they were over and done when our remote ancestors were cowering in unlit caves. By the same token, the



events which today are shaking the very fabric of our lives are all transpiring on the knife-thin edge of a little pebble in the sky, and they will not cause the slightest perturbation in the cosmos. As a matter of fact, all one has to do is go up as high as some of our supersonic planes can go to discover that the boundaries between nations are in men's minds, not on the natural terrain.

One can also take the long view through time. The organizations among men we call "nations" come and go; a name may persist and the human content change, or the reverse—and this is as true for what we now call "Russia" and the "United States" as it was for Rome and Babylon.

### *Human Values*

I think that the main sources of divergent opinion about strategy in the war with communism are differences in the assessment of human values. This was particularly clear in a debate between Bertrand Russell and Sidney Hook on the pages of the *New Leader* (May 26 and July 7, 1958). Russell maintained that a Communist victory would certainly not be so great a disaster as the extinction of human life, whereas Hook maintained that, even if his policy (essentially deterrence through fear of retaliation) led to extinction of the human race, it would still be preferable to a Communist victory. I myself would have to side with Bertrand Russell in this calculus of human values. For one thing, although sheer survival is not a very lofty goal in itself, it is (as Russell pointed out) a prerequisite for the achievement or enjoyment of any other value. Second, where there's life there's hope, and, as long as there are thinking human beings around, there is always a chance for improvement.

I must also agree with Russell that it is selfish and arrogant for a small segment of one generation to make such a decision

for all people and for all future time. Hook quite frankly says that his argument is addressed only to the present generations: "They must make the choice—only *their* desires, wishes, fears, and hopes count." His argument must really be addressed only to the adult generation in *this* country, because neither our children nor the millions of humans in India, China, Canada, South America, and so on have much say in the matter. The calculus of values also includes preservation of our "way of life"—not just in the here and now, or in the name of a particular political organization, but in the minds of men and the way they behave toward each other.

Now, I do not claim that there is any one "right" way to assess and weigh these values. But, being firmly committed to the democratic way of life, I do believe that individuals should be allowed to make their own calculations, express them publicly, and, in the leavening process of democracy, participate in what really should be the "great debate" of our time. This is what Hook would not allow. He says: "The primary issue between us is whether Russell's position will contribute to the failure of those negotiations [between the United States and the U.S.S.R., on inspection systems, etc.] and whether mine will contribute to their success." Elsewhere he suggests that "Russell's recent views . . . have already done so much harm to the free world" and that the Kremlin has been encouraged to risk aggression through the belief that we might be guided by his views. Hook's position here is doubly wrong, I think. In the first place, it condemns the freedom to express divergent opinions upon which is based the way of life Hook himself presumably favors; second, it assumes that the great debate which we have hardly begun has already been decided. I think it is high time to bring this debate fully out into the open. To be able to do so is a sign of strength, not weakness, in our democratic way of life.

## REQUIREMENTS FOR VICTORY IN THE WAR WITH COMMUNISM

Victory in a "hot war" with Russia—even granting that winning such a war is conceivable—would not mean victory in the "cold war" with communism. Many people do not seem to realize this. As a matter of fact, it would be entirely possible to "win" the short-term military encounter at the expense of losing the long-term ideological conflict—that is, by adopting a totalitarian way of life.

The war with communism is a pervasive conflict between alien political philosophies, and, being such, victory must be sought in the minds of men. Yet most of the discussion of policy in a nuclear age has been framed in technological terms and carried on more by physicists and engineers than by social scientists. If I am right, nuclear technology merely sets the problem; it neither explains our difficulties nor offers any real solutions.

We must first ask ourselves this: What are the conditions which support the Communist (or any other totalitarian) way of life as against our own way? Then we must ask: How can these conditions be changed within the existing setup of competing sovereign states? It soon becomes clear that any solution entails a major job of social engineering.

### *Conditions Which Support Totalitarian Systems*

**Economic scarcity.**—When people exist near a bare subsistence level, little energy is left over for the development of those uniquenesses (in dress, in dwelling, in fare, in experience, in belief) which make people important as individual human beings. Underdevelopment of basic industries in pre-war Russia kept most people near the subsistence level; diversion of national energies into military and scientific efforts has continued this condition. Insistence on the dignity and freedom of

the individual develops as capacity for, and awareness of, differences between people increases.

*Social inequality.*—Totalitarian systems display gross inequalities in civil, political, and social rights, based on the distribution of power if nothing else. The working of the system tends continuously to reduce social mobility. The Russians came, via revolution, from one system of extreme social inequality under the tsars into another under communism. The economic equality identified with the term “communism” (and now more in name than in practice) does not extend to social equality—the Communist party in Russia is an elite into which the masses of the people have only limited access.

*Educational deficiency.*—Limited or biased education prevents people from acquiring the tools needed to improve their state. Totalitarian systems characteristically, though not inevitably, develop in places where the masses of the people are relatively uneducated. Although the Communists have been greatly expanding the education of their people, it has been for the purposes of the state rather than for any liberalizing influence it might have.

*Information restriction.*—Free flow of communication, both within and across national boundaries and both among individuals and via the mass media, provides the diversity of viewpoints in which lies the vitality of the democratic system and the freedom of choice people need to govern themselves. Such freedom is the anathema of totalitarianism. It is important to note that, although the Communists have increased educational opportunities, they have not relaxed to any significant degree their control over communication.

*External threat.*—Threat from outside impels people to accept subservience to the state and to forego individual freedoms, in the interest of what they perceive as the common group goal—namely, survival. Totalitarian leaders, including

the Communists, have regularly employed such a threat to gain acceptance of their policies. The same thing applies to democratic systems. It is when we feel secure from outside enemies that we are most free to engage in healthy bickering among ourselves; it has been in times of external threat that we have tended to lose our freedoms to speak, to dissent, to know, and to act as we please.

#### *Modifying These Conditions*

The totalitarian way of life is primarily a political conception of the relationship between individuals and their government, but it is more than that. It is also a social conception of the relationship between man and man, and even between parent and child, in which individuality tends to be submerged by authority. This conception expresses itself in the ways people habitually behave toward each other, as well as in their expectations and in the significances they attach to events. But, being matters of habit, these conceptions can be modified. The problem is *how*—given the existing state of affairs. What is the logical design for solution of this problem?

When scientists, working on their own much smaller-scale problems, want to change something, they operate on the conditions which produce the phenomenon. In our present, infinitely larger-scale problem we would like to so modify the background conditions in Communist and other states as to foster and support a more democratic way of life. If we could succeed in doing this, no matter what the strategies employed, we would be taking a giant step toward final victory in what I have called the real war.

The world situation today is one of extremely high mutual threat perception between two coalitions of essentially sovereign states. Degree of autonomy *within* these coalitions is much less than *between* them, of course. It is a bipolar power

situation aggravated by a fundamental ideological conflict. In vicious circular fashion, mutual threat perceptions are driving an arms race and vice versa. The combination of ideological differences and threat perceptions has led to intense security measures, and both sides have erected "iron curtains" through which only carefully metered dribbles of communication can pass.

I, therefore, see rational policy as requiring two phases: *Phase I—reversal of the tensions/arms-race spiral.* Before any other policies can be employed effectively, mutual threat perceptions must be reduced to a level where the arms race can be halted and then put in reverse. Not only is this obviously necessary to escape the very real danger of mutual annihilation, but it is also the only sure way to dissolve the "iron curtains" that hinder the use of other strategies. *Phase II—maintaining the peace.* It is my contention that our way of life flourishes in peace time and the totalitarian way in wartime. If I am right, then prolonging the peace works in our favor.

It is apparent that many of the conditions supporting the Communist way of life cannot be manipulated directly in our present world situation. They all require penetration of the "iron curtains" in one way or another, and, therefore, strategies pertaining to them belong in Phase II. On the other hand, we *can manipulate the condition of external threat directly.* This variable is at least partly under our control—because we ourselves, in our words and actions, contribute to the level of threat which the Russians perceive. We can behave so as to raise this threat or lower it; we can change it abruptly or in gradual stages. The critical, but very sensitive and difficult, Phase I—reversal of the tensions/arms-race spiral—hinges on our intelligent manipulation of the condition of external threat.

PHASE I: REVERSAL OF THE  
TENSIONS/ARMS-RACE SPIRAL

The most obvious way to bring an end to the arms race would be to negotiate *bilateral* agreements on such things as testing bans, inspection systems, and, ultimately, arms reductions. We see behind us a long trail of unsuccessful efforts along these lines. Let us look now, therefore, into the possibilities of *unilateral* action.

*Complete Unilateral Disarmament*

*Analysis of a highly improbable situation.*—Suddenly, without prior hint or warning, on the morning of May Day, 1961, the world communications networks rock with the biggest news item in history: RUSSIANS JUNK WEAPONS!! The story goes on, with quotations direct from Khrushchev himself, to the effect that the Communists have decided to call off their suicide pact with the capitalists across the sea; that, even though they were in a position to win the war, they have the larger interests of humanity at heart; that they believe the Americans will welcome this relief from continuing fear and will respond in kind. To demonstrate the complete good faith of the Russian people, Khrushchev invites the American President to select a large delegation of civilian scientists and military officers to come to the Soviet Union to observe the public dismantling and deactivation of all major nuclear and other weapons—"only leaving armaments sufficient for our own internal security."

Just what would be the most probable reactions of our government and our people to such an event? Perhaps we know our own situation well enough to make reasonably good predictions. The first reaction—in statements by public officials and in newspapers—almost certainly would be "It's a trick!" and we would become doubly alert for surprise attack. But as hours and days went quietly by, more and more pressure would

be brought to bear by reasonable people to look into this situation fully. So, with our defenses up, we would carefully extend our feelers and explore the Russian action. Gradually it would become clear from on-the-spot reports, from the freedom of our observers to go anywhere unhindered, that this was no trick but the absolute truth—we would find ourselves no longer faced by a powerful, threatening enemy.

At this point we would feel somewhat awkward standing there with an immense military machine in our hands. Certainly, we would be under great pressures both from within and from without to follow the Russian example. Would we take advantage of the defenselessness of the enemy releasing nuclear devastation upon him? I am certain we would not. Would we occupy Russia for a time and try to establish democracy there? We might, but I think we would find it difficult to impose a system of beliefs and make it stick. I think we would rapidly reduce our own armaments, would enter willingly into agreements for world inspection and control systems, would arrange for extensive trade and cultural exchange, and so on. In short, what began as unilateral disarmament would soon become mutual disarmament.

*Analysis of an equally improbable situation.*—Now let us turn the tables and apply this kind of solution to ourselves. If we were to take the same unilateral step of complete, publicly announced and publicly observed, disarmament, what might we expect from the Russians? I am sure that their first reaction also would be one of suspicion—"Look out! It's a trick!" This would be good, because it would provide them time for rational appraisal. There would be a news blackout within and across the Iron Curtain, in all probability, while the Russian leaders "worried it out." Then there would be tentative investigation and finally full and complete inspection and observation.

But what would be the Communist reaction when it was



realized that we were defenseless in a military sense? Would they leap to destroy us with nuclear weapons? I am sure they would not—because it would be unnecessary, and it would reap certain moral disadvantage. Would they occupy us and try to make good Communists out of us? They might, but I think that in the long run they would be changed more in the process. Would they aggressively spread communism over the world? To West Germany? To Korea? To India? They might by non-military means, but overt aggression is rather pointless when there is no external threat. What I think they would do is divert their own productive capacity back toward civilian needs, take full advantage of the productive capacity of the United States to raise their own standard of living—and thus gradually adopt the conditions which foster a more democratic way of life (regardless of the fact that it might be called “communism”).

*The fundamental objection to unilateral action.*—I can almost hear the objections at this point. All this is fantastically, incredibly unrealistic! It may be true that Americans would react to a defenseless enemy in this way, but Russians are another kind of animal altogether. And even if the Russian people could be assumed to be more or less like us in fundamental respects, you certainly cannot assume that about the Russian leaders. As Sidney Hook has said, men like Stalin, Bulganin, and Khrushchev—the whole crew of the Kremlin—are power-mad fanatics. “Today, a Communist world would be a tightly knit despotism of fear without sanctuaries, without interstices to hide, without possibilities for anonymity. . . . A Communist world could easily become a scientific Gehenna . . . our children and grandchildren may curse us for turning them over to the jailers of a Communist 1984 in which, brainwashed and degraded, they are not even free to die until their masters give them leave.”

I deliberately decided to present the hypothetical case for abrupt and complete unilateral disarmament first—because it draws out what I believe is the deepest objection to any solution of this sort. This is what I shall call the *bogeyman conception of the enemy*; it is clearly illustrated in Sidney Hook's arguments above. Now, I certainly do not claim any exclusive possession of the truth, and it may be that Hook is more nearly right in this than I am. But I can show how the bogeyman conception develops naturally out of the dynamics of human thinking—when little minds seek simple consistencies in a complex world, or big minds, like Hook's, operate under intense emotion, as I think was the case. It can also be shown, in retrospect, that we have produced bogeymen in every past war—the Simon Legree of the Civil War, the murderous Santa Anna of the war with Mexico, the Kaiser of World War I, the cruel, buck-toothed Jap of World War II. Of course, there may be elements of truth in these images, Adolf Hitler being a case in point, but the question before us is the Russian bogey and its validity.

What are the dynamics of bogey-building? First, we have the focal belief that *WE* are good, pleasant, kind, honest, fair, noble, and so on; in the ordinary use of terms, as they apply to everyday interactions with friends and neighbors, this is a necessary and generally valid belief. *WE* are opposed to *THEY*; *ALLY* is opposed to *ENEMY*. Since the Russian Communists have been clearly identified as our enemy, psycho-logic dictates that *RUSSIANS* must be bad, unpleasant, cruel, dishonest, unfair, bestial, and so on—the opposites of properties we attribute to ourselves. But then we have groups of visiting Russians in our homes and on our farms—we find them friendly, interesting, and in many ways just like us; our own tourists return from Russia with reports of how friendly, helpful, cultured, and sincere the Russians were—what jolly camaraderie

there was with Russian *friends* in the restaurants and so on. This puts the attitude system under stress again—how can RUSSIANS be unpleasant, unfair, and bestial and yet at the same time be friendly, helpful, and just like us? The typical resolution—and one familiar to researchers on human thinking—is to break the concept RUSSIAN into two parts and assign the conflicting traits to the different parts. It is THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE who are really friendly, kind, and just like us, whereas it is THE RUSSIAN LEADERS who are the bad, dangerous, cruel, and unpleasant fellows. Fortunately, for the preservation of our crude mental maps of the complex world, we are less likely to have personal contact with these bogeymen. It may be noted in passing that such dynamics foster the hope, held out by many commentators, that the good RUSSIAN PEOPLE must soon overthrow the bad RUSSIAN LEADERS. This has been a dominant theme of “The Voice of America.” No doubt the Russian man in the street wonders why the good AMERICAN PEOPLE just like him have not yet begun the revolution against their bad CAPITALIST LEADERS!

I am not familiar with any direct evidence on the Russians, but the social sciences have amassed considerable evidence for the essential similarities of peoples of different races and nationalities in many basic characteristics—for example, in intelligence, in ability to solve problems, in the variety of emotions and capacity for feeling and expressing them. In our own work we have been able to show that groups as different as Americans, Greeks, Japanese, and Navajo Indians use essentially the same basic dimensions in making meaningful judgments and even share subtle synesthetic tendencies and metaphors to a high degree. I realize that one can point to what seems to be contrary evidence about the Communists: there were blood baths during the early days of their revolution and violent purges since then; there was the ruthless stamping-

down of counterrevolt in Hungary; there are salt mines in Siberia; there have been executions of men like Nagy. It is to be regretted that men can be inhumanly cruel to each other, but this is a potentiality in all men, fostered by the very conditions we would like to change.

What were the conditions under which the Russians behaved this way? The Communist revolution unleashed violent hatreds that had been festering for decades; Russia has been, until very recently, a big but industrially and culturally backward country; the Russian people suffered more, I believe, than any other during World War II; they have had reason to perceive an external threat for a long period, and revolt in the satellite countries was probably seen as incited by the West and certainly as threatening to their security. If not sufficient, these are certainly partial reasons for their behavior. And, then, trying to apply what I called the third stage in clear social thinking, I must ask about the mote in our own eye. I know that, if "we had the gift to see ourselves as others see us," we might better comprehend how they interpret our treatment of some minority groups, our use of atomic bombs against Japanese population centers, and our refusal to agree to ban the use of nuclear weapons. We have explanations for these things, it is true, but the Russians are just as blind to our justifications as we are to theirs.

What, then, do I conclude about the bogeyman? I am sure it would be unrealistic to completely discount the real differences between the Russians and ourselves—particularly those concerning the value of individual human beings which stem from our ideological conflict. I am also sure that the Russian bogeyman has been overdrawn in the workings of our own mental dynamics—particularly by those intellectuals who do not distinguish between Russian communism and German nazism. In other words, *the Russian bogey can be cut down*

to more realistic size and shape. The similarities between us are probably much greater than the differences we stress; their perceptions of the present situation and reactions to it may be much like our own, and they would probably welcome a way out as much as we would.

*Rejection of Complete unilateral disarmament.*—It is obvious that any policy which would leave this nation abruptly and completely defenseless would never be accepted. It asks American Man to act in a uniquely civilized way and to assume that Russian Man would respond in kind, but human culture is not ready for such a big step. Even though it is completely infeasible, presentation of this unpopular alternative has served to bring out what is probably the deepest source of resistance to any non-aggressive proposal—the bogeyman conception of the enemy.

#### *Case for Graduated Unilateral Action*

Imagine two husky men standing facing each other near the middle, but on opposite sides, of a long and rigid, neatly balanced seesaw. As either man takes a step outward, the other must compensate with a nearly equal step outward on his side or the balance will be destroyed. The farther out they move, the greater the unbalancing effect of each unilateral step and the more agile and quick to react both men must become to maintain the precarious equilibrium. To make the situation even worse, both of these husky men realize that this teetering board has some limit to its tensile strength—at some point it is certain to crack, dropping them both to destruction. So both men are frightened, but neither is willing to admit it for fear the other might take advantage of him. How are these two men to escape from this dangerous situation—a situation in which the fate of each is bound up with that of the other?

One reasonable solution immediately presents itself: let

them agree to walk slowly and carefully back toward the center of the teetering board in unison. To do this they must trust each other. But these men distrust each other, and each supposes the other to be irrational enough to destroy them both unless he (ego) preserves the balance. But now let us suppose that, during a quiet moment in the strife, it occurs to one of these men that perhaps the other really is just as frightened as he is and would also welcome some way of escaping from this intolerable situation. So this man decides to gamble on his new insight and calls out loudly, "I am taking a small step toward you!" The other man, rather than have the precarious balance upset, also takes a step forward, whereupon the first takes yet another, larger step. Thus they work their ways back to safety by a series of unilateral, yet reciprocal, steps—very much as they had originally moved out against each other.

*Assumptions underlying this policy.*—We will talk about graduated unilateral *disengagement* (rather than disarmament) to emphasize the fact that we are considering a much wider range of acts of a tension-reducing nature than the notion of disarmament includes. This policy is based on the assumption that the Russian people and leaders are sufficiently like us to accept an unambiguous opportunity to reduce the probability of mutual nuclear destruction. It also assumes that the Russian leaders are susceptible to moral pressures, both from without and from within, since such pressures are an index of the success or failure of their system. It assumes that, unlike mutual negotiations which can easily be twisted into cold-war propaganda, unilateral acts of a tension-reducing nature are relatively unambiguous. It assumes that each unilateral act that is reciprocated makes the next such sequence easier to accomplish. Finally, it assumes that the Communists are as convinced that their way of life will win out in non-

military competition for men's minds as we are that ours will and that they would be satisfied to compete on those terms. Many statements by Communist leaders in recent years indicate that this is their view.

*Nature of this policy.*—To be maximally effective in inducing the enemy to reciprocate, a unilateral act (1) should, in terms of *military aggression*, be clearly disadvantageous to the side making it, yet not cripplingly so; (2) should be such as to be clearly perceived by the enemy as reducing *his* external threat; (3) should not increase the enemy's threat to our heartland; (4) should be such that reciprocal action by the enemy is clearly available and clearly indicated; (5) should be announced in advance and widely publicized to ally, neutral, and enemy countries—as regards the nature of the act, its purpose as part of a consistent policy, and the expected reciprocation; (6) but should not demand prior commitment to reciprocation by the enemy as a condition for its commission.

In general, the initial acts of unilateral disengagement would be small in magnitude of potential risk, should they not be reciprocated, but would increase in magnitude of risk potential as reciprocations were obtained. The initial series of unilateral acts would be designed to be cumulative in their tension-reducing effect upon the enemy but non-cumulative in their effect upon our capacity to deliver massive retaliation should this policy fail—that is, the acts would not be such as to weaken us progressively in the same area or in the “survival” area at all. Progressive unilateral disengagement should be viewed as a Phase I “primer,” as a means of starting a reversal in the kinds of reciprocal actions now being made (i.e., the arms race); it should not exclude other policies, such as mutual disarmament negotiations, as they become available to us. Above all, it should be a policy entered into sincerely as



an attempt to probe the enemy's true intentions, not as merely another weapon in the cold war, and it should be continued consistently until it is entirely clear what the enemy's intentions actually are.

The following is intended solely as an illustration of what a sequence of unilateral tension-reducing acts might be like; it is not a proposal of what the specific acts should be. As I tried to make clear in the beginning, I do not have the necessary training or information to make concrete proposals in this area, but I am sure there are people in our government who would be fully capable of doing so.

1. The United States government announces to the world that on a date one month from that time it intends to share with the Russians (and all other nations) the information it has been gathering on the conditions of outer space, on the manufacture of "clean" nuclear bombs, and on various other developments in science whose main values are peaceful and scientific in nature. We indicate that, whereas our own action is not contingent upon their prior commitment, we expect them to respond in kind by sharing information of a similar nature. We also announce that this is part of our new policy—to reduce world tensions by direct, progressive unilateral steps.

2. On the date set, this action is taken. Our next move depends upon what the Russians have done at this point. (a) If they have reciprocated, we take a larger step: perhaps we announce that one month from that time we intend to deactivate and withdraw from a major military base—one closest and most threatening to the Russian heartland—and we invite them to send observers to check this operation. Again, we assert our general policy and suggest appropriate reciprocation on their part. (It probably should be pointed out that, in an age of nuclear missiles, stable military bases whose locations



are well known are "sitting ducks" anyhow, since they would be the first targets in a surprise attack against us; their only value is in terms of threat or in terms of a surprise attack on our own part—which I have argued we would not launch.)

(b) If the Russians have failed to reciprocate to our first unilateral act, we take another small step: perhaps we announce that on a date one month from this time we intend to ban for a period of one year all further tests of nuclear weapons, and again we invite their inspection. We restate our general policy and our expectation that they will reciprocate.

3. On the date set, this second unilateral action, (a) or (b), is taken. If the Russians have been reciprocating, we take still larger steps bearing on focal points of tensions. It is quite possible, of course, that by this time the Russians may be trying to outdo us in "walking inward on the seesaw"—they have already made some tentative moves in this direction (e.g., their unilateral decision to ban nuclear-bomb testing for a period). If, on the other hand, the Russians have not reciprocated, I think we should continue our series of tension-reducing but non-crippling acts until either mounting moral pressure forces them to reciprocate or their negative intention becomes completely clear.

I believe that graduated unilateral disengagement can provide the basis for a positive and consistent foreign policy, one that is appropriate to international relations in a nuclear age and one in which we can take the initiative. In recent years our foreign policy has been essentially reactive and opportunistic. This is not only ineffective but downright dangerous, because it allows others to manipulate us by simply applying the right stimuli. We could find many opportunities to apply "psycho-logic pressure" to the Russians, if we were not such blind adherents to our own psycho-logic—that is always taking a posture of opposition to them, regardless of the issue. For

example, we should side with them on issues where we can do so in good faith—which would put their oversimplified picture of the world under stress. Acceptance of China into the UN may be a case in point. It seems to me that we have accepted too readily the role of defending the status quo, and, in doing so, we have forgotten that our own way of life is itself a major revolution in men's minds that is just getting under way.

#### *Consideration of Some Objections*

There are many deep-seated objections to any non-aggressive policy of this sort, and it will be well to anticipate them.

*More emotional objections.*—The most deep-seated objection to the policy I have outlined goes back to what I have called the *bogeyman conception of the enemy*. Many people will argue that any unilateral act designed to reduce tensions would be interpreted by the Russians as a sign of weakness and, given their inherent nature, would encourage them to encroach further on the free world. I cannot deny this possibility. But, if this is their inherent nature, then we should be sure of it before the present balance of military power has shifted to any significant degree.

Some Americans would see this policy as deliberate subversion, a *Communist-inspired Trojan Horse*. They would see it as a proposal that we surrender without a fight, and anyone making such a proposal must, so psychology dictates, be on the Communist side. The argument that this is a strategy designed to get us out of a dilemma and win the real war would be incomprehensible to them. The fact that this objection flows more from emotion than from reason does not minimize its effectiveness.

Many more Americans would probably see this policy as a coward's way, a kind of "moral disarmament," and therefore

entirely distasteful. *Pacifism* has always been associated with weakness in the American meaning system; in times of peace it may be good-weak (i.e., Milquetoast), but in times of war it quickly becomes bad-weak (cowardly). This, too, is as illogical a criticism as it is potent. The man who throws away his gun and faces his enemy with his bare hands and his wits is certainly not a coward. Neither are the men who follow the dictates of their reason and conscience against authority or public opinion.

Probably many people, however, will see this policy as an idealist's fantasy—certainly not one that faces up to the hard realities of the world in which we live. They would say that to weaken one's own defenses in the present situation is as softheaded as it is softhearted. However, what seems realistic within one's time-bound frame of reference may seem highly unrealistic within a broader scheme of things. What we call "realistic" usually depends upon what is habitual, what we are familiar with, and immediate goals. Thus it is "realistic" to concentrate on earning a living, getting one's children through school, and getting a little fun out of life, but it is "idealistic" to concentrate on the world of the future. So, too, it is "realistic" to react to outside threat with demands for more weapons, and "idealistic" to worry about where it is all leading us. Anthropologists are familiar with cultures that, through continued blind adherence to practices that once were "realistic," are gradually committing suicide. I think we are in exactly the same spot. We are continuing to practice rites and rituals of international relations that were developed in, and appropriate to, the past—firmly believing them to be "realistic"—in a present age that renders them suicidal.

*More rational objections.*—But there are objections to graduated unilateral disengagement that arise from considerations other than its unpopularity. Even many of those who agree

with the logic of my general argument may come to the conclusion that *it is simply not feasible*. For one thing, the existing attitudes and beliefs in the public mind, coupled with my own principle of psycho-logic, make it likely that, even if such a policy were adopted and sponsored by thoughtful and courageous leaders, both it and they would be rejected by the vast majority of people in this country. And more than that—would our leaders, charged with responsibility for the security of the nation, dare to take the risks such a policy involves? My answer would be that unpopular causes have been won before. Attitudes and beliefs can be changed. During the period when Russia became our ally and bravely defended Stalin-grad, some of our own research at the time showed that we not only came to think of Russians as *kind, noble, and fair*, but even as more *Christian!* Reviewing some of the war movies of that period is quite convincing on this score.

But what about the objection that *graduated unilateral action involves too much risk*? Although graduated disengagement does involve progressively increasing risk—indeed, the open and explicit assumption of risk is essential for its acceptance by the enemy—I believe such risk must be taken in the interest of our long-term security. Particularly is this true because, as I have tried to show earlier, our present policies involve equal or greater risk but yet offer no long-run hope of either security or winning the real war with communism. We must simply accept it as given that *there is no policy, no alternative we can choose, that entails no risk*. The best we can do is to weigh the risks involved in different policies against the ultimate gains that might be achieved.

Another objection made on the grounds of feasibility is this: are not my conditions—(1) that acts must be disadvantageous to us in a military sense and (3) that they must not increase the threat to our heartland—incompatible? In the first place,

there is no perfect correlation between the military significance of events and their psychological impact. The execution of Nagy had no military significance, but it certainly affected attitudes toward the Communists. The Russians' first Sputnik and their more recent shot to the moon did little to change the balance of military power, but they certainly had far-reaching psychological effects on people in the United States. The full implications of nuclear armaments for what does and what does not constitute military potential must be carefully considered in devising unilateral acts. T. W. Milburn has argued, most wisely, I think, that there is a certain minimum capacity for retaliation that has a maximum deterrent effect on an enemy—to be able to annihilate him ten times over does not further deter him than to be able to annihilate him once! This also illuminates the essential irrationality of our arms-race mentality; just as if we were engaged in some sports event, we keep being told that we must get and then stay "ahead."

This leads to another criticism—that this policy seems to amount to *betrayal of our obligations to defend the free world*. This question needs to be studied most carefully. Although it is true that graduated unilateral disengagement would mean reducing our military support in some areas where communism is in delicate balance with more liberal political views, does this necessarily imply defeat of our way of life in these areas—particularly if we succeed in reducing tensions between East and West generally? Often what is "communist" in name is no more antagonistic to our way of life than some governments we are supporting for power reasons (e.g., Franco Spain). In the long run, the so-called "underdeveloped" countries will achieve greater security if the Russians and Americans stop using them as pawns in a global chess game. Most importantly, our own security in a nuclear age is coming

to depend less and less upon allies or upon territorial control—particularly as intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads become available. Just as we would not now risk starting a full-scale war for a remote foreign objective, so is our own liability to attack coming to be independent of geographic distance. The British are already well aware of this sobering fact. And even if we were, against our own self-interest, to engage in continuous “brush-fire wars” about the perimeter of the free world, one can reasonably ask in just what sense this “defends” other nations. In the sparring of the two giants, it is the little countries on whose soils the skirmishes take place who suffer the most severe wounds.

This is a good place to point out the essential difference between the Kissinger Plan and my own proposal. Both the limited-war strategy and that of graduated unilateral disengagement rely on our capacity for massive retaliation for ultimate security of the heartland, but also use it as the basis for other acts of foreign policy. The crucial difference is this: Where Kissinger would use nuclear deterrence as the support for further tension-increasing acts (“war as usual”), I would use nuclear deterrence as the support for further tension-reducing acts. My proposal views the United States and Russia as gradually and carefully *disengaging* themselves along the far-flung border between free and Communist worlds, rather than as gradually and dangerously engaging themselves more and more inextricably.

Finally, there are some questions of practicality. Even assuming we were to undertake such a policy, would the Russians accept our unilateral acts, and we their reciprocations, as *bona fide*? Applying the same arguments I brought to bear against mutual negotiations, could we not expect the Russians to perceive our acts as “cold-war” deceptions? As a matter of fact, have we not taken unilateral steps before, particularly

right after World War II, and been sorry for them? I would argue, first, that there are now deep and sincere desires on both sides to escape from the present course. Many of our earlier unilateral actions were made with one hand, while the other was busily building more devastating atomic bombs—when no one else had them. Second, and most importantly, unilateral acts, unlike mutual discussions, have the status of *fait accompli*, just like the satellite circling our globe. It is difficult to deny the fact of their commission (particularly when they are announced in advance and publicly observed); argument over the motivation of the first act tends to be resolved by execution of the second. As to our distrust of Russian acts of reciprocation, there is a principle of human behavior that seems very relevant here: Man A's interpretation of Man B's reaction to him depends heavily upon A's own prior behavior toward B. If American Man has made an intentional conciliatory act toward Russian Man, he is much more likely to perceive the Russian's reciprocation as bona fide than if it came unsolicited.

But what if, because of mutual distrust, one side tried to take advantage of the other's unilateral action? Would this not have the "boomerang effect" of even further intensifying mutual bogeyman conceptions? It would be the self-fulfilling prophecy with a vengeance. This, of course, is the risk we take, but with *graduated* unilateral acts the initial risks are small. And here again the essential difference between unilateral acts and attempts to achieve mutual agreements must be emphasized: *unilateral actions do not demand prior commitment for their execution*. Whereas mutual disarmament discussions can break down because of mutual distrust and biased perceptions of what is equable, thus fulfilling the prophecy previously made and allowing each side to blame the other for the failure, an announced unilateral action is

taken regardless of prior commitment from the other side to reciprocate. Prophecies made by the other side cannot therefore be fulfilled.

Actually, I believe that the pressure of world opinion, to say nothing of the growing power of China, would soon force the Russians to at least go through the motions of reciprocating on the low-risk level at which this policy would be initiated. And here another general principle of human behavior becomes relevant: *When people are made to keep on behaving in ways that are inconsistent with their actual attitudes (e.g., as if they really trusted each other), their attitudes tend to shift into line with their behaviors.*

#### PHASE II: MAINTAINING THE PEACE

The policy of graduated unilateral disengagement is conceived as a Phase I strategy for reversing the irrational tensions/arms-race spiral before it leads to a blowup. It is also to be viewed as a *primer*, a policy which, if successful, would gradually produce conditions where longer-term, continuing policies designed to strengthen and maintain the peace could be instituted.

##### *Renewed Negotiations for Mutual Disarmament*

If my analysis of the situation has been correct, two of the major hindrances to successful negotiation—biased perceptions of what is equable and self-fulfilling prophecies—are exaggerated by the existence of high tensions between the parties (distrusts, suspicions, aggressions, anxieties). Successful execution of a series of reciprocated unilateral acts would certainly reduce these tensions, even though not eliminate them. There would still be biased perceptions of what is fair and just, but, if the parties are mutually aware of this tendency



toward bias and particularly if they expect what is really equable to appear somewhat biased in favor of the other side, then successful negotiation can be conducted. It is perhaps more true of the American side than the Russian that the negotiators themselves are not sure how well they represent their own country's position, especially since that position tends to shift somewhat with national elections and the like. In any case, reduced tensions should find the press and the public more likely to make hopeful rather than dour prophecies. There would still be attempts to get the better of any bargain ("one-upmanship"), but this is what negotiations are for.

As J. D. Singer has suggested, negotiations are most likely to be successful, and should therefore begin, *on procedures for handling future issues*, rather than on present problems of conflicting interest. For example, mutual agreements on how to handle the armament of future satellite bases of Russia and the United States could probably be achieved more easily now than agreements on how to handle the Berlin situation. Similarly, negotiations might begin to nibble away successfully at testing bans and inspection systems, then proceed (as tensions reduce and confidence grows) toward cessation of stockpiling nuclear bombs, and finally turn to elimination of the capacity of both sides for massive nuclear retaliation.

At this point, however, we must stop abruptly in our analysis and look around: Can what are today the two dominant military powers eliminate their capacities for massive retaliation when tomorrow there might be a France with a nuclear arsenal, the day after tomorrow a China, and the day after that an Egypt, and so on? Obviously not. It follows, therefore, that *disarmament negotiations and agreements will of necessity become universal at some stage*. As I noted earlier, nuclear weapons will become the "great equalizer" among na-

tions in the new age we are entering. It also follows, inevitably, that inspection and policing operations will eventually have to be world wide and therefore involve strengthening of some form of world government. Whether we like it or not, gradual reduction in national sovereignty seems to be the price we will have to pay for our continued security.

*Other Conditions That Support Our Way of Life*

*Economic plenty.*—As our Iowan farmer and friend of Mr. Khrushchev so sagely observed, men who have good food in their bellies, good clothes on their backs, and good homes for their families are much less likely to be aggressive toward their neighbors. We who yearly have surplus crops, and factories that could easily increase their productivity, have not seen fit to use them in the cold war against communism. At a national cost much less than the armament burden, we could subsidize export trade to foreign countries where it is badly needed, at prices they could afford to bear (and thereby not harbor the "rich-uncle" resentment). The objection that this policy would enable enemy countries to further divert men and materials to weapons, it seems to me, is outweighed by the influence this would have on their way of life and their motivation toward war.

*Educational opportunity.*—It is almost a truism (though not quite) that, the broader and more liberal a person's education, the better is he able to understand the points of view of others and even to evaluate more critically his own point of view. Although we have been expanding our programs of exchange students and scholars, the numbers have been rather closely proportional to the ease of our relationship with the countries involved. In other words, and for obvious if invalid reasons, the rate of personnel exchange has been in inverse ratio to the density of the "iron curtain." It should be

just the other way around; personnel exchanges should be increased in just those places where tensions are greatest—as a way of achieving mutual understanding and thereby maintaining the peace. It has also been true that we, in our ethnocentric fashion, have been much more eager to have others learn from us than we have been eager to learn from them, and this has had unfortunate effects on our foreign relations.

*Communication.*—The more correct information the common people in different countries get about each others' ways and views, the more likely they are to appreciate the underlying similarities and to discount the more superficial differences. Whether the mass media are controlled by the state, as in Russia, or are relatively free from government regulation, as in this country, they play the major role in disseminating cross-cultural information. And in the case of a free press, at least, playing this major role means assuming a major responsibility. In the area of international relations, this means providing a faithful picture of world events as they occur and a factual interpretive framework within which the public can make its own judgments—rather than trying to make the news by presetting how the public should react to present and future events, as is the way with totalitarian media. Since media people are subject to the same national pressures and “atmospheres” as the rest of us, they have a difficult job maintaining the necessary objectivity. It also behooves us to learn all we can about how people in other countries think, how they use language, and what their basic attitudes, beliefs, and values are. The more we know about these things, the better we will be able to talk to them and understand what they are trying to say to us—and the better we will be able to maintain the peace.

A figure draped in a raw shade of mustard yellow with a face that was neither human nor yet quite simian, but partook of the worst qualities of both man and ape, leered at me from the red cover of the book of fables which I owned as a child. Not only was the figure hideous, but the colors were so intense that, whenever I jiggled the book, this evil spirit came to life and shifted back and forth so that, in order not to have to look at it, I had to hold the book face down and open it from the back.

**... BUT AESOP NEVER  
WROTE A THING!**

*Not on paper, anyway. But how he could talk!*

*Here is a report on how the famous fables were handed down, with some new translations from the Greek of Valerius Babrius by Denison B. Hull and drawings by Rainey Bennett.*



Who or what was this figure? I supposed that it was the author, for the title of the book was *Æsop's Fables*, and as there was no relation between the figure on the cover and any of the fables inside, I assumed, of course, that it was a picture of the *Æsop* which had written them. I had no idea what an *Æsop* was; it evidently wasn't a man; and yet it wasn't an ape either. The cabalistic symbol *Æ* frightened me, even though the author wrote a "moral" after each fable. But, as the book

had no preface and no introduction, and as I was convinced that the Thing on the cover was the author, I asked no questions, and so I didn't learn the truth about Aesop for years.

To recapture the original flavor of Aesop's fables, we must return to original source. It would be nice to know what Aesop himself wrote.

Alas! So far as we know, Aesop never wrote anything at all! We believe, from what Herodotus tells, that he was a Greek who lived from about 620 to 560 B.C. and that he told fables. We know that beginning about 400 B.C. almost all fables were ascribed to Aesop and that these fables were written down, being sometimes quoted singly, as Aristophanes quoted them in his comedies, and being sometimes collected. But, in spite of some highly imaginary biographies of Aesop, that is really all that we do know about him. So, if we wish to recapture the freshness of his fables as they were first told, we must go to the best of the early writers who collected them in books.

It is only a little over a hundred years ago that our best source was found. In 1840 Abel Villemain, head of the Department of Public Education of the French government, wished to obtain some ancient Greek manuscripts if any could be found, for at that time the Greeks had only recently won their fight for independence from Turkey, and interest in Greek archeology and antiquities was high. So he commissioned a Macedonian Greek, Minoides Minas, who had been living in Paris endeavoring to obtain support for the new Greek nation, to go back to his native land to see what he could find. In the Great Lavra, one of the monastic communities on Mount Athos, he found a parchment manuscript, buried in rubbish, containing one hundred and twenty-three fables in Greek verse. Comparison with other manuscripts previously discovered showed at once—for there were duplications of a number of them—that they were the main body of the fables written by

Valerius Babrius, an Italian who was a contemporary of Alexander Severus, Roman emperor from A.D. 222-35, and were in fact entitled *The Aesopic Fables-in-Verse of Valebrius*, a name evidently the result of telescoping two names—Vale[rius Ba]brius.

The high literary quality of Babrius' fables was noticed at once. They were poetical and full of beauty and pathos, and far superior to the oldest known version of Aesop, the Latin verses of Phaedrus written about the time of the emperor Tiberius. Where Phaedrus was dull and matter of fact, Babrius was colorful and imaginative, and altogether more representative of the Greek spirit of fable.

Of course, Babrius and Phaedrus were not the only ones who collected Aesop's fables, but they were by far the best. Demetrius of Phalerum wrote them down about 300 B.C., although his version has been lost; Avianus wrote them in Latin verse even after Babrius (the date is not certain), although he seems to have merely versified a Latin prose translation of Babrius. Finally, Maximus Planudes, a Byzantine scholar who lived from A.D. 1260-1330, made an attempt to collect all the Aesopic fables and to write a life of Aesop, but his life of Aesop is improbable, to say that least, so that doubt is thrown on the accuracy of his fables. But Planudes' version was for many centuries considered the true one, and translations from it were made in many of the tongues of Europe; an English edition was printed by Caxton in 1485. But these are far from being all. Aesop's fables have been used by countless generations of schoolboys as exercises, and countless generations of schoolmasters have required their small charges to put a prose fable into verse, to write a moral to a fable, to write a fable to illustrate a moral, and so forth. The proof of the system is the endless variety of the fragments of fables which have been found.

In the Aesopic tradition each fable is followed by a moral. In the manuscript found by Minas there were morals too, but,

although they were written by the same scribe as the body of the fables, there was considerable evidence that they were not written by Babrius himself but had been inserted into the text to conform with tradition. For Babrius wrote his fables as literature, not as lessons, and he does us the honor of assuming that we are intelligent enough to get the point without the necessity of having it rapped on our knuckles. This, then, is just one more reason for going to Babrius to recapture the freshness of Aesop's stories. Fortunately, by doing so we also add more fables to our store.

Phaedrus and Babrius both wrote their fables in verse. So did the greatest of modern fabulists, La Fontaine. Fables, I think, belong in verse because it gives them the epigrammatic quality and crispness they need to point a moral, especially if the moral is not spelled out. In choosing an English verse form suitable for rendering the Greek, I could think of no better model than John Gay's *Fifty-one Fables in Verse*.

The Greek text which I have used is that of W. Gunion Rutherford, M.A., of Balliol College, Oxford, published in 1883.

## The Mule

A mule was eating grain and hay  
Out of his idle trough one day,  
And having finished, ran along,  
And kicked his heels, and brayed this song:  
"My mother, mind you, is a horse,  
And I can run as swift a course."  
But then he stopped. He had, alas,  
Recalled his father was an ass.





## The Wolf and the Heron

A wolf once had a bone stuck tight  
Down in his gullet. In his plight  
He told a heron if he'd go  
'Way down into his throat below,  
And then pull up the wretched thing,  
And thus relieve his suffering,  
He'd give him some appropriate pay.  
He pulled it up, and right away  
Requested payment as agreed.  
The wolf with toothy grin indeed  
Remarked, "You should be satisfied.  
Your head's been in a wolf's inside;  
You've got it out—undamaged too.  
That should be pay enough for you."

## The Two Packs

Among the gods when time began  
Prometheus lived. He made a man  
All molded out of earth and plaster,  
And thus produced for beasts a master.  
He hung on him two packs to wear,  
Filled with the woes that men must bear,  
With strangers' woes the one before,  
But that in back, which carried more,  
Was filled with evils all his own.  
Hence many men, I think, are prone  
To see the ills some other bears  
But still be ignorant of theirs.





## The Fox and the Wolf

A hapless fox once chanced to meet  
A wolf, and begged that he would treat  
Her with some mercy, spare her still,  
Respect her age, and please not kill.  
He said, "I will, by Pan, if you  
Will tell me three things that are true."  
"First, then, I wish you'd never met me;  
And, second, were too blind to get me;  
And third," she said, "another year  
You wouldn't live to meet me here."



## The Cat and the Cock

A cat, in order to waylay  
Domestic hens throughout the day,  
Hung like a bag upon a hook.  
A prudent cock, his beak a crook,  
Observed, and sneered, and sharply cried,  
"In all this world both long and wide  
I've never seen a bag like that  
Which has the teeth of one live cat."


## The Three Bulls and the Lion



Three bulls were grazing every day  
Together while a lion lay  
In wait to catch them. But, thought he,  
He simply could not catch all three.  
So using festering calumnies  
He turned them into enemies,  
And separating each from each,  
He had three meals in easy reach.

## The Raven and the Fox

A raven stopped when he had bitten  
A piece of cheese. A fox, hard smitten  
With longing for the cheese, deceived  
The bird as follows: "I am grieved,  
O raven, for although your wings  
Are beautiful above all things,  
And too, I see, your eye is bright,  
Your neck is charming to the sight,  
And like an eagle, you've a heart,  
And talons, too, to take your part  
Should any creature dare dispute—  
You do not caw, for you are mute."  
The raven, flattered, puffed, and proud,  
Let go the cheese to cry out loud.  
The wise fox took it with her tongue,  
"You are not voiceless, then; you've sung.  
Well, raven, that is evidence  
You've everything," she said, "but sense."



# Social Change

**D**uring the American Occupation of Japan (1945–52), that country was not only occupied by American troops and politically controlled by American officials but was subjected to almost every conceivable variety of American influence.

Today the American interlude in Japanese history is over, and the Japanese seem to be repudiating much that the Americans tried to accomplish. But so great was the American impact—which, although of short duration, was the most powerful concentration of foreign influence ever to be exerted upon the

# in Japan

## THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY?

*How well did the "democracy" imposed by the American Occupation take in Japan? The answer, says native observer*

*Kazuo Kawai*

*lies in Japan's changing social scene.*



eclectic culture of Japan—that its effect on the Japanese is not likely ever to fade completely away. Whatever they do will continue to reflect, even if obversely, some measure of this overwhelming intrusion into their lives.

At a time when renascent Japan, recovering from her post-war debility, is looking more and more toward re-establishing herself in world affairs, the key to her future conduct may well be found in the long-range effects of the American influence that was once so powerfully exerted upon her. Although she can

no longer hope to play a major independent role in world politics, her remaining potentialities may still enable her to be a decisive factor in a close balance of international alignments. What role she will be inclined to play in this balance—whether as a force for reaction, for radicalism, or for democracy—may be significantly conditioned by what her experience with the Americans meant in her national life.

The writer hopes that his background as a newspaper editor in Tokyo, where by birth and social ties he was completely identified with Japanese life, has enabled him—despite his American academic experience—to contribute some insights into Japan which may have escaped the Western observer.

The crux of the problem of the democratization of Japan lies in social change. Whatever may be the reforms instituted by the Occupation in the political, legal, economic, or educational fields, these institutional changes must necessarily remain merely formal and superficial until the nature of Japanese society becomes sufficiently compatible with their aims as to give them real substance. The question, therefore, is whether the development of Japanese society has in fact become sufficiently set in the direction of permanently sustaining the changes wrought by the Occupation.

Democracy is premised on the essential equality of all individuals and on the right of the individual freely to exercise his own choice. The reforms sponsored by the Occupation were intended to accord with this basic principle of democracy—although not all of them actually did so. Thus the new constitution was based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty whereby essentially equal individuals freely choose to be bound in contractual political relations with one another. The various political, administrative, and legal implementations of the constitution spelled out in detail this basic democratic principle. The

economic reforms were designed to provide an environment favorable to this principle, and the educational reforms were designed to promote appreciation of it. These reforms have proved in the main to be more successful than had generally been expected and in some respects conspicuously so. But at the same time there are obviously reasons for misgivings.

Traditionally, the Japanese state had been conceived as a great patriarchal family, comprised in turn of countless lesser families. In such a society the family rather than the individual was the basic unit. So basic was the collective entity of the family as the working unit of society that, in circumstances and for functions where the natural family was obviously unsuitable, artificial collective entities like guilds, gangs, and secret societies—generally referred to generically as *kumi*—tended to take the place of the family, patterning not only their operating processes but even their organization, their internal relationships, and the ritual which symbolized the norms of their value system upon those characteristic of the natural family.

This did not mean that ritual kinship groups, strictly speaking, were a particularly ubiquitous or conspicuous feature of Japanese society, but they did exist; and even where they did not exist, as in the more informal and tenuous relations between associates in most occupational and social groups, certain characteristics similar to intrafamily relations nevertheless were manifest in some measure. In such relationships the participants were seldom equals, each free to make his own individual choice. The individual found his justification and his life fulfilment only in performing his proper role and in occupying his proper status within the structure of his group. His individual will, therefore, was subordinated to the prescribed obligations of his relationship to the other members of his group.

Obviously, such a social system was not democratic. Yet neither was it wholly authoritarian, for, despite the rationaliza-

tion provided by Confucian ethics—or rather by a Japanese interpretation of Confucian ethics—the Japanese family differed significantly from the patriarchal Chinese family, in which the father was the absolute, though benevolent, autocrat. It is true that the father in aristocratic Japanese families somewhat resembled the Chinese father, for the privileged position of many aristocratic families rested on the patrimony which the father held from his overlord. Hence the father was all-important, and the other members of the family were wholly dependent upon him. But among commoners, particularly among the peasants, the family farm and the subsidiary household activities required the co-operative labor of all the members of the family. The father could not be the absolute autocrat, for he was as dependent on the services of the other members of the family as they were on his services. Thus, in accordance with the task assigned to each member of the family, each person had a unique status with corresponding rights and duties. Although the individual had little independent existence apart from the basic family unit, within the family he did have rights as well as duties which the father usually could not arbitrarily override.

These intrafamily relations did not stem wholly from the moral authority of the father, as in the true Confucian family, or from spontaneous and voluntary affection, as in the interpersonal relations of individuals in the American family. In the Japanese family, although elements of both authority and spontaneous affection existed, the relations partook somewhat more of the nature of contractual obligations. The relationship between parent and children, or between husband and wife, was not of dominance and submission purely, but there was a strong element of reciprocity—as of repayment of debt owed to one another.

Professor Takeyoshi Kawashima, the foremost Japanese authority on the family, characterizes the relationship in the Chi-



nese Confucian family between the patriarchal chief and the other members of his family as a "master-slave" relationship. Ideally, the master is benevolent, but, benevolent or not, the other members of the family have a general obligation to serve and honor the master. In contrast, says Kawashima, the Japanese family is more feudal than patriarchal. The inferior members of the family have specifically defined "rights" which they can expect from the superior members, in return for which there is reciprocation of specifically defined "duties." In the feudal system a vassal receives land from his lord, and only because of this grant, or fief, does the vassal owe allegiance to the lord. Similarly, to state it somewhat baldly and exaggeratedly, in the feudalistic family the children owe allegiance to the parent only by virtue of the parent's bestowal upon them of benevolence. There is no generalized, absolute loyalty or unconditional piety; there is only conditional, specific obligation.

However, inasmuch as the aristocrats had historically shaped the making of laws and had been the more articulate, and since they were the ones most interested in maintaining absolute authority, the standards of the aristocratic family had become the official norms. Thus the official interpretation of the Meiji Constitution [set up by a small oligarchy in 1889], if not its formalized institutions, inclined toward authoritarianism and patriarchal paternalism. The pre-Occupation Civil Code accorded legal recognition to the pre-eminence of the family, bestowed distinctive powers upon the head of the family and provided for the perpetuation of the family headship through primogeniture. The subordination of the individual to the family was particularly reflected in the legal status of women, for, under the old Civil Code, while a spinster who was the head of her individual household had the same legal status as a man, a married woman had virtually no legal competence separate from her husband and had distinctly inferior and limited rights as

compared to her husband with respect to such matters as inheritance and ownership of property and right of divorce. Thus the individual was legally subordinated to the family as represented by its titular head.

In actual operation, however, the contractual rather than the authoritarian aspects of interpersonal relations were more important than the official norms might indicate. This was particularly true in quasi-family relations wherein, for instance, a teacher would feel obliged to extend a father-like benevolence over his disciple, while the disciple would feel obligated to repay the debt of favor with perpetual loyalty, or wherein an employer would feel an obligation to accord paternalistic protection to his employee while the employee would feel obliged to reciprocate with faithful service. This was the "feudalistic" *oyabun-kobun* system—literally "father-like-childlike" system—of reciprocal obligations between liege lord and vassal, between boss and henchman, between patron and protégé, which pervaded almost all aspects of Japanese life. Such a relationship was not necessarily arbitrary, autocratic, or exploitative, for not only did both sides possess socially sanctioned rights as well as obligations but the intimate and subtle relations between the two often made each of them highly sensitive to and appreciative of the interests of the other. But such a relationship, however beneficent, was not democratic in the Western sense of according free play to the individual wills of essentially equal persons.

In view of such a social background it might well be questioned whether the democratic reforms of the Occupation could go beyond a superficial form. Would not the Japanese continue to behave in accordance with their accustomed traditional social patterns so as informally to circumvent and nullify in practice the democratic institutions set up by the Occupation?

In the summer of 1947, a SCAP [Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers] spokesman declared that a vast and insidious network of feudal forces threatened the democratic policy of the Occupation. As reported by American correspondents, the impression was created that SCAP had uncovered an "invisible empire" engaged in a conspiracy to subvert the Occupation. The Japanese were puzzled and resentful, for they knew of no such movement and could not imagine what the Americans were talking about. Even Socialist Prime Minister Tetsu Katayama, mild and docile though he usually was, protested vigorously that he knew of no feudalistic underground. It evidently became clear that the SCAP officials were not referring to any subversive political movement but were merely referring to the racketeering gangs operating on the border zones of legality. The picturesque language of exaggeration used to describe them resulted from the amazement of the SCAP officials as they came to realize fully what they had heretofore only vaguely suspected, namely, that the extensive power and influence and discipline of the gangs rested largely on the tight and elaborate web of *oyabun-kobun* relations between boss and henchmen.

Although the gangs worked in such lowly fields as the black market and the protection racket among small shop and street-stall keepers, the illicit working arrangements which they apparently had with the police suggested a powerful influence which might penetrate into much higher levels of the government. If such influence was based on an age-old and deeply rooted traditional pattern of social relationships, would not the whole structure of the new responsible, representative government be rendered impotent? It is understandable that some Occupation officials thought of the possible ramifications of the unfamiliar *oyabun-kobun* influence in nightmarish terms.

Actually these gangs did not differ much from the underworld gangs of American cities with respect to either their activities or

the dynamics of their power, although the strength and extent of the oyabun-kobun relationships gave them some unique features. Furthermore, although such gangs had had a very long and often romanticized history in somewhat the spirit of the Robin Hood legend, the extent of the gangs' influence which so amazed the Occupation officials was largely, though not entirely, a postwar phenomenon. Amid the administrative and economic breakdown following the surrender, when the authorities were unable to look adequately after the hordes of demobilized soldiers and repatriates, gangster bosses had set up well-organized black-market businesses and petty rackets as well as legitimate businesses which provided—in exchange for a regular assessment—a livelihood for those who would otherwise be unemployed. In one sense it was extortion, but it was a well-regulated extortion which seemed to many willing "victims" a reasonable fee to pay for the opportunity to make a living. The boss provided an essential social service; the beneficiaries paid him tribute and counted themselves his henchmen. When rival gangs resorted to violence in their competition, or when a boss used his strong-arm squads to discipline recalcitrant henchmen, the resulting scandal was embarrassing; but the local police and administrative authorities were understandably tempted to view the gangs with indulgence for performing in their own rough way many useful functions which otherwise would have had to be assumed by the overburdened authorities themselves. This tacit farming-out of public functions was of course not regular, but in itself it was not a much greater threat to the new democracy in Japan than the indulgence of the police in some American cities toward certain gangster activities is to American democracy.

Some Occupation officials were also greatly disturbed over their discovery of the labor-boss system, in which day laborers belonged to permanently organized gangs held together by

oyabun-kobun ties under a boss who exacted a percentage of their wages but who saw to it that they were supplied jobs or looked after them when times were bad. It was embarrassing and frustrating to the Occupation officials preaching democracy and individual freedom to find that the only labor the United States Army could hire for work on constructing military housing or for stevedoring military stores had to be contracted through labor bosses who held a feudalistic control over the workers.

But, while the actual menace of the racketeering gangs and the exploitative authoritarian nature of the labor-boss system were imagined in an exaggerated form by some Occupation officials, the insidious implications of the oyabun-kobun system to the democratic process in government could not be ignored. While the oyabun-kobun system could often operate as a quick and effective channel of communication to transmit the wishes of those at the lower levels to those in power at the top to the mutual benefit of both, it could also operate to hold together a tightly disciplined political machine more efficiently than could the use of simple patronage of the type familiar in American politics. Japanese politicians, associating originally for the inevitable "back-scratching" and "log-rolling" familiar in politics everywhere, might inevitably become enmeshed in a web of mutual obligations and tied into exclusive cliques whose members would be permanently bound by a socially sanctioned sense of intense loyalty to one another in all circumstances. Such a relationship, while perhaps not so different in motivation and in essential nature from the shifting and temporary exchanges of favor among Western politicians, could be quite different in the degree of its perniciousness. If the actions of a politician or a voter should be determined by his obligation to a group rather than by his own individual free will, then obviously democracy would be endangered.

From one point of view, the constitutional and political reforms instituted by the Occupation are quite significantly breaking down the traditional patterns of group control of politics and giving rise to independent individual politicians whose power rests directly on popular support in their constituencies. At the same time, factionalism and the interplay of special interest groups based on ties of obligation to collective entities continue to be features all too prominent in Japanese politics.

In the field of intrafamily relations, which are probably of more basic importance than are political relations in setting the general pattern of interpersonal relations in Japanese society, the situation seems equally confusing. The new Civil Code, which implements the equal individual rights guaranteed by the new constitution, seems to be making possible the emancipation of the individual from the social controls exercised by the family. Nowhere is this tendency more dramatically manifested than in the changing position of women, as evidenced by the entrance of women into political activity, by the increase of career women in business and in the professions, by the increase in the number of love matches in which the marriage partner is not selected by the parents, by the increase in the number of divorce suits initiated by women who no longer feel much inhibition about taking the offensive against men, and by the increasing number of husbands who help their wives with the grocery-shopping or sometimes even help with the dishes. On the other hand, such emancipated individuals are still undoubtedly in the minority, though a growing minority, and, even where they are in substance abandoning traditional practices, they usually feel it expedient for the sake of social respectability to go through the forms of the conventional practices. Thus young people who have independently made their own choice of marriage partners usually call on their parents to go through the motions of fixing a family-arranged match accord-

ing to the traditional form, or the wife who in the privacy of their home makes her husband wash the dishes meekly waits hand and foot on him when guests are present. Traditional standards are thus persistent in form, even where they are crumbling in fact.

In this confused situation abounding in highly divergent and contradictory evidences, one can quite easily see whatever one wants to see and draw whatever conclusions one is predisposed to draw. Some are impressed with the magnitude of the changes and feel sure that Japan is in a transitional period in which most of the reforms instituted by the Occupation are on the way to becoming permanently established. Others are impressed with the tenacity of traditional attitudes and feel that, once the impetus of the Occupation dies down, Japan will essentially lapse into the traditional way of life.

On reflection it appears that the change which has taken place in Japan in the postwar period is not basically different in kind from the change which has been going on in Japan ever since the beginning of her modernization and so-called Westernization. The tempo of this change has fluctuated from time to time. The Occupation obviously represented a vast stepping-up of the tempo for a while; today there has come to be a slowing-down and even a reaction in some sectors of Japanese life. But over the years the process of change has been going on, and while the postwar years represent a difference in degree, they do not represent a different kind of historical phenomenon from that which has long been going on in Japan.

European nations underwent modernization as part of a gradual historical evolution. Non-Western societies are undergoing modernization in consequence of Western influence, but different non-Western societies undergo this process in different ways. Non-Western societies of a relatively primitive sort undergo modernization as a consequence of colonization and



economic exploitation by the West. In such societies the impact of the West causes the native cultural order to disintegrate, then to be replaced by elements of Western civilization. The content of the change is largely determined by the nature of the Western influence that is directed upon the native society. But in a complex, civilized, non-Westernized society like Japan's the impact of the West does not result in the disintegration of the native cultural order and in the bodily substitution of elements of Western culture. Although the Western impact is impelling enough to cause change in the native society, the national culture strongly persists; and it is native cultural ends rather than the character of the Western influence that largely determine what new techniques and what new ideas will be accepted for adaptation and utilization. Here change and modernization may be very rapid and extensive rather than otherwise because the full force of the national culture itself—using traditional as well as newer means of social control—can be directed toward promoting the desired change.

Modernization in Japan is thus neither a spontaneous evolutionary process nor a process inexorably imposed from the outside but the result of ends and means more or less consciously formulated by the Japanese themselves. In other words, in terms of applicability to the problem of understanding the changes in postwar Japan, the key should be sought not in the Occupation reforms so much as in the objectives and plans of the Japanese.

Knowledgeable analysts of social change in Japan have pointed out that the Japanese, in their conception of their objectives from the time of their first contact with the West down to the present day, have tended to divide into three distinct groups, which might be termed, respectively, those who hold to the "conservative hypothesis," those who hold to the "liberal hypothesis," and those who hold to the "pragmatic hypothesis."



Although such labels are somewhat misleading because of unintended but inescapable political connotations, and although wide variations and inconsistencies in individual behavior cause the three groups to appear to overlap greatly, these labels do quite clearly identify the three distinguishable orientations in attitude among the Japanese.

The "conservative hypothesis" contends that successful and desirable modernization for Japan depends on maximum continuity with Japanese cultural tradition. Those who hold to this view welcome modern Western technology and even many aspects of modern Western social and political organization, but only as instruments for giving effect to traditional cultural values. The businessman who adopts modern labor-saving machines in his office so that he can have more time to indulge in his hobby of ceremonial tea which gives him supreme spiritual satisfaction and the neo-Shinto cult that maintains a radio station to broadcast appeals for a return to the worship of the Sun Goddess are crude and obvious examples of adherents of the "conservative hypothesis." The *genro* Ito, who went to Europe to find the model of a constitution for the purpose of reviving traditional imperial authority, is a more apt historical example. However much they may adopt specific aspects of Western technology, members of this group do not welcome the introduction of Western cultural values or social behavioral patterns and regard technical change as a separate or independent process which ought to take place without changing the original cultural base.

The "liberal hypothesis" contends, on the other hand, that successful modernization for Japan depends on introducing into Japanese society all the changes brought about in Western society through "natural" historical evolution. While the purpose may be similar to that of the conservatives—namely, to enhance the power and glory of Japan—this group believes that

the adoption not only of Western technology but of a Western cultural and institutional model as well would be to the benefit of Japan. Communists, syndicalists, some Socialists, some Christians, and other nonconformists who completely model their life styles and preferences on Western standards obviously belong to this group. But men like Yukichi Fukuzawa, the famous founder of Keio University, who all his life avoided political controversy and remained on a basis of intimate and respected relation with those in power, was also an adherent of the "liberal hypothesis" in that he unobtrusively but consciously nurtured the growth of liberal Western ideology through his educational and writing activities.

The "pragmatic hypothesis" contends that neither traditional values nor Western models are suitable to meet the complex and unique needs of modern Japanese life, that human beings are not capable of infallible judgment on such matters anyway, and that successful modernization for Japan should be based on the common-sense policy of coping with specific and immediate situational problems as they arise. Under this theory, as under the others, the Japanese would exercise deliberate control over the changes to be introduced but would strictly limit their goals and plans to short-term ones which could easily be seen as appropriate to immediately obvious needs instead of projecting comprehensive plans to accord with preconceived ideological schemes or models. This is the hypothesis which, for reasons to be discussed presently, appealed strongly to most of the Japanese.

Given the circumstances of the Japanese historical and social background, it was probably inevitable that the "conservative hypothesis" should be more popular among those who exercised political power and enjoyed social influence. Thus the "conservative hypothesis" was usually regarded as the orthodox line, and there developed the view—quite prevalent in the

West—that the so-called Westernization of Japan was but skin-deep, that Japan merely adopted Western technical tools while retaining essentially traditional standards in her social and spiritual life.

A closer analysis of the historical record will undoubtedly reveal, however, that in fact the "conservative hypothesis" did not usually prevail. While the conservative, the liberal, and the pragmatic schools never lost their respective theoretical orientations, in practice both the conservative and the liberal groups came to approximate the pragmatic group. It is true that in some periods either the conservative school or the liberal school was clearly dominant. Prior to the 1880's and again during the early stages of the Occupation the liberal school enjoyed great vogue. Throughout the 1930's and until the surrender in 1945 the conservative school—particularly an extreme and bigoted section of that school—wielded dominant power. But during most of Japan's modern history, while the conservative school outwardly appeared dominant, it was the pragmatic course of action that actually prevailed, with consequences that are very significant to an understanding of the Occupation period.

The reasons for the prevalence of pragmatic conduct are not hard to understand. The conservatives soon found that Western technology very often could not be made to work effectively without changes in the social and cultural attitudes and in the pattern of interpersonal relations of those who would make use of it. Of course, as many observers have pointed out, it is true that there are innumerable examples of traditional social organization and group dynamics successfully harnessed to run modern technical operations; the result is not only an extremely rapid and smooth assimilation of modern technology to the existing social environment but also the revitalization of traditional values. But it is equally true that there are innumerable

examples where Western technology has been found to work best—or to work only—in a social milieu quite different from the traditional Japanese one. Hence, while refusing to abandon their theoretical goals, the conservatives often found it necessary to accept much more from the West than they had originally bargained for.

Many of the conservatives thus found it expedient to put at least part of their cultural goals in temporary cold storage and, like the pragmatists, to concentrate on short-term situational needs. Also, in order to make use of the talents of the liberals, which were sometimes sorely needed, the conservative leaders compromised with them on the short-range, *ad hoc*, pragmatic programs. Thus, while continuing to pay lip service to the “conservative hypothesis,” those who wielded power in Japanese public life became more and more indistinguishable in action from those who held to the “pragmatic hypothesis.”

In a somewhat similar manner, those who held the “liberal hypothesis” also tended to approximate the actions of the pragmatists. Inasmuch as the conservatives usually occupied positions of power in Japanese society, the liberals found that they had to disguise their beliefs if they were to escape being relegated to oblivion. Therefore, while holding to ultimate liberal goals, many of them found it expedient in their outward conduct to conform to the conservative pattern of behavior and to work together with the conservatives wherever they could find a common meeting place on the neutral ground of a short-range pragmatic program. Thus, while the pragmatic program was regarded by the conservatives as a temporary concession to expediency and by the liberals as an entering wedge for something more extensive, both nevertheless joined to make the pragmatic line of conduct the prevalent one. Lack of space precludes a documentation of this interpretation here, but detailed study of the great formative years of the Meiji period in

modern Japanese history makes it amply clear that the major changes, while deliberately fostered and manipulated by the elite leadership group, were developed in the pragmatic manner rather than in accordance with any comprehensive pre-conceived ideological scheme.

The willingness of so many conservatives and liberals alike to temporize on a pragmatic program instead of holding out for their beliefs in defiance of consequences, as indeed a comparatively few extremists on both sides did, points to what might be regarded as a relative lack of principle or lack of dogmatism on the part of most Japanese. Although exceptional individuals and exceptional periods have not infrequently been seen in Japanese history, generally the Japanese have shown a preference for conformity to widely acceptable middle positions. Whether it stems from a paucity of logical philosophic thinking, or from the "situational ethics" (discussed elsewhere in my book), or from a social system which emphasizes an equilibrium of contractual relations, the Japanese tend to seek easy accommodation to circumstances. In view of such characteristics, even more important than the willingness of conservatives and liberals to compromise is the weight of the majority of the people, who are temperamentally attuned to the pragmatic position and favor it for itself without conscious thought of expediency. A plodding advance over the road of practicality, rather than soaring flights of idealism or principle, seems to be the genius of the Japanese, just as "muddling through" is of the British.

This interpretation needs to be carried one step further. Although both the conservatives and the liberals adopt the pragmatic line of action as a matter of temporary expediency, continuation of this expediency in the long run works slowly to undermine the conservatives more than the liberals. Even narrowly technical innovations, once adopted, are likely to have

ultimate effects beyond those intended by the planners. Modern technology, and widespread industrialization based upon it, tend to bring in their train an insidious transformation of many non-material aspects of life as well. While indoctrination and propaganda may delay the effects for a while, there develop rational habits of thinking, new forms of administrative organization and procedures, greater social mobility, recognition of individual ability with consequent respect for individual worth, new types of social relationships, and changed standards of values—such as the substitution of a universalistic ethic for the old particularistic ethic—wherever the old culture is found to be unsuitable in these respects to the needs of technology. While they may perhaps come about far too slowly and too haphazardly to satisfy the liberals, these changes threaten to get out of hand so far as conservative goals are concerned. Even conservative innovations thus contribute to the growth of a cultural medium in which there can be advance toward liberalism.

This does not necessarily mean the ultimate victory of the “liberal hypothesis” over the “conservative hypothesis,” for there may be no conscious abandonment of traditional cultural standards and no conscious adoption of a Western model. But innovations deliberately instituted for pragmatic—or even conservative—ends almost always generate a chain reaction whose cumulative effect in the long run is a changed cultural environment in which the limited conservative goals are eventually discovered to be no longer relevant and are left behind. To the extent that Japan adopts modern technology and engages in modern industrial activity, the basic conditions that govern her national life will tend to resemble those of Western nations. As this happens, her cultural environment will also undergo change, and in the same direction. Finally, although a considerable time lag is to be expected and although, because of his-

torical differences, Japan can never exactly duplicate the West, there may eventually evolve a transformed Japanese cultural pattern in which political, social, and spiritual values fairly comparable to those of the West will be more truly expressive of Japan's own new national life than will be the traditional standards of her fading past.

This interpretation might profitably be applied, by way of example, to the appraisal of certain specific Occupation reforms.

Take the matter of responsible government, which is the key element in political democracy. The Meiji Constitution, with its glorification of the position and theoretical authority of the Emperor, appears to be a manifestation of the "conservative hypothesis," namely, the adaptation of the Western technical device of a written constitution and of Western governmental forms to buttress the ancient political myths and to serve the ends of a traditionalist oligarchy. The new constitution, with its emphasis on popular sovereignty, appears to be a manifestation of the "liberal hypothesis," namely, the adoption of a Western model of a democratic political theory. Yet, an examination of the historical background would seem to indicate that the change from the old constitution to the new constitution was not an abrupt change from the clearly conservative to the clearly liberal, for the old constitutional system had been evolving in a pragmatic manner into something with even some liberal implications. It will be recalled that the ruling oligarchy which had formulated the Meiji Constitution in conformity with the "conservative hypothesis" soon found it imperative to make dramatic compromises. While the oligarchy had no desire to share power with the popular political parties, and indeed while the real intention of the oligarchy was to blunt the opposition of the political parties, individual oligarchs found it expedient to join political parties and, as party leaders, to attempt to manipulate the parties in the direction of the policies of the oligarchs. How-



ever subordinate the role of the parties, this represented some concessions to the distinctive function of parties in the governmental process, and to that extent it meant a diluting of the oligarchy's monopoly on authority.

While the conservatives thus compromised to the extent of working in some degree through the political parties, many of the liberals on their side also compromised to the extent of Minobe, seeking limited gains within the framework of the conservative-dominated government instead of directly opposing the government. [Professor Tatsukichi Minobe was a leading liberal in the 1920's.] Minobe's "organ theory" was a theoretical rationalization of the pragmatic point of view which the compromising liberals could accept. Unlike the more uncompromising of the liberals who frankly espoused some Western model of government and were consequently hounded by the authorities, the pragmatically inclined liberals accepted the conservative constitutional system as a starting point. But while purporting to be loyal to this conservative system, they tried to give it the most flexible interpretation possible. While starting from a seeming acceptance of the traditional sovereignty of the Emperor, they led gradually from authoritarianism to increasingly responsible government. In all this, probably few of these compromising liberals were aware that they were making a compromise. Undoubtedly, most of them were unconsciously manifesting the native predilection for moderate ideas of a practicable and gradualistic nature.

While the liberals were never able to take over power completely for themselves, it is significant that the oligarchs were forced to make more and more pragmatic compromises, until by the 1920's something close to responsible party government had come to prevail. While very imperfect and feeble by Western standards, it represented a great change and advance from



the government originally intended by the conservative authors of the constitution.

This change and advance in the government came about only in part through the conscious effort of the liberals. More important was the fact that, while the conservatives and the liberals were engaging warily in short-range pragmatic co-operation with each other, the basic conditions of Japanese national life were undergoing modification in a direction unfavorable to the conservatives. As modern industry supplanted agriculture, the traditional bases of the power of the oligarchy became increasingly irrelevant to existing conditions; the immediate and specific situational problems calling for solution involved the new social classes and new vested interests created by the industrial economy, and the base of political power had to be broadened to include these new elements. Pursuit of even short-range pragmatic programs thus brought about a succession of changes which in the end went far beyond the limits envisaged by the conservatives.

This analysis might seem to be refuted by the rise of the militarists in the 1930's and the loss of all the democratic achievements made up to that time. But actually the validity of the interpretation is not affected. Admittedly, the democratic gains had not yet been consolidated and intrenched to the point where they could successfully resist determined assault, but the fact that the opponents of the democratic changes felt impelled to resort to violent and forcible counteraction only attests to the reality of the democratic changes that provoked them. When the anachronistic reaction should spend its force, as it was bound to do eventually because it was fighting against the inexorable march of time, the pragmatic trend toward more change and modernization was bound to be resumed.

It is against this background that postwar constitutional change needs to be evaluated. Defeat in war had discredited the

reactionaries; the liberals apparently stood vindicated. It was now obvious that Japan still had much to learn from the victorious West. The "liberal hypothesis" thus came to enjoy great vogue. When the Occupation imposed upon Japan the Western model of popular sovereignty in the postwar constitution, it therefore received considerable measure of sincere acceptance, for it was in line with the ideology of those who subscribed to the now popular view. But despite the temporary vogue of the liberal position the conservatives and the pragmatists were still very much alive. As the initial reaction to the defeat wore off and the Occupation drew to an end, the liberals who had waxed brave under the protective wing of the Occupation found that they could not continue their program alone. They had to take into account the existence of the conservatives and pragmatists. Moreover, while many conservatives whose self-confidence had been shaken by the effects of the war had gravitated easily into the pragmatic camp, comparatively few of them could make the jump all the way to the liberal camp. The practicable course for all, therefore, was to compromise again on the basis of short-range pragmatic programs.

It was the realization of the practical desirability of the pragmatic course from the beginning that caused so many who believed in ultimate liberal goals to feel consternation over the crudely "liberal hypothesis" basis of the "MacArthur Constitution." Thus the present movement for the revision of the new constitution and for the modification of many of the political reforms of the Occupation period does not necessarily represent a trend toward complete repudiation of democracy and revision to traditionalism. It represents the reassertion of the historic tendency toward pragmatism. Even many liberals are willing to support this movement in the belief that the way to make solid progress toward democracy lies in short-range pragmatic compromises, relying on gradual modifications in the general cul-

tural environment to make possible further successive steps toward the ultimate goal. Such a compromise is not the result of deliberate stratagem; it represents the genius of most Japanese to incline toward gradual changes rather than toward a rigid status quo or cataclysmic revolution.

Just one other example might be briefly drawn, namely, in the social sphere with respect to the change in the status of women. As already mentioned, under the prewar laws women did not have the right to vote, women generally—with some technical exceptions—did not have property rights separate from their husbands, women—again with some technical exceptions—did not succeed to the family inheritance, and women were entitled to fewer grounds for divorce than were men. Here was a manifestation of the “conservative hypothesis,” the use of the modern technical device of a system of codified law, based in large part on the model of the Code Napoléon, to perpetuate the traditional subordinate position of women in Japanese society.

Under the postwar constitution, women are guaranteed exactly the same rights as men; and, through the new laws implementing the new constitution, women enjoy the right to vote, they may own property as individuals separate from their husbands, they succeed to exactly the same share of the family inheritance as do their brothers, and they enjoy exactly the same grounds for divorce as do their husbands. This would seem to be a manifestation of the “liberal hypothesis,” the improvement of the position of women through the adoption of modern Western standards as well as of the Western legal technology. It has therefore become quite common to attribute to the Occupation, and specifically even to the informal example of the American G.I.’s treatment of women, the chief influence for bringing about the change in the status of women in Japan.

Such a view, however, is most superficial. The change was not

a simple change from the clearly traditional to the clearly liberal. If the change had been introduced primarily as an imitation of American example, it would not have taken hold; the reforms in the law concerning women would have remained paper reforms only. To the extent that the legal reforms have been accepted in practice, they reflect a real change that has been taking place in Japanese society from within, and this change has been going on since long before the Occupation.

Even while the old laws were in effect, which supposedly embodied the "conservative hypothesis" upholding the traditional subordinate status of women, the pragmatic requirements of an increasingly technological Japanese society had been affording increasingly greater educational opportunities to women, had been affording increasingly greater vocational opportunities to women, had been increasingly freeing women from traditional social controls as industrialization gradually broke up the collective authority of the extended rural family and substituted the greater social mobility and individual independence of the nuclear urban family. This tendency was particularly pronounced during the war—paradoxically, supposedly a reactionary period—when as the result of the man-power shortage women flocked into industry in larger numbers than ever before. Women ran the streetcars and the railway and subway trains, women handled much of the food-rationing, women conducted much of the fire-fighting activity during the air raids, and women generally took over much of the work formerly considered to be solely the province of men. Women came to play a new role in Japanese life, and with the new role came a new status and new socially sanctioned rights.

If the women are now divorcing tyrannical husbands—as they are doing in increasing numbers—it is not because the Occupation-sponsored law says they can, but it is because husbands are no longer their only available meal ticket. If the women are now

attaining public office—as they are doing increasingly—it is not because the new law says that they now have the same political rights as men, but it is because there are now more women with experience in industry and in business and in labor unions and in civic organizations who are capable of holding their own against the men at their own game. The new status of women is resulting not so much from a conscious adoption of Western standards as from the internal changes in Japanese society developing out of pragmatic responses to a succession of immediate situational needs.

The same sort of examples can be drawn in almost any field. Modern industry, adopted by the *zaibatsu* [“money clique”] originally as a mere technical instrument, has called into being the countervailing force of an organized labor movement and a Socialist party powerful enough to challenge the *zaibatsu* dominance over the nation’s economy. Western technology, with its demand for professional technical competence, has also been causing the *zaibatsu* organizations to fall increasingly under the control of a professional managerial class whose career interests become a countervailing force against the original traditional, exclusive family character of the *zaibatsu* system. It is these forces arising out of pragmatic adjustments to immediate situational needs, rather than the American model of trust-busting legislation, which are slowly but surely transforming the character of the *zaibatsu*.

The same sort of process is causing the labor boss system to wither away in areas where governmental social security measures and public employment agencies are beginning to offer day laborers greater benefits than the paternalistic favors labor bosses can offer to members of their gangs, is causing the peasants to break loose from the undue influence of the rich man of the community as his money-lending function withers away with the growth of credit co-operatives, and is causing individ-

uals to cut loose from family controls as job opportunities induce the children to leave the family farm and live by themselves in factory towns. These changes are pragmatic responses to changing social situations rather than an ideological conversion from traditional loyalties to new models of ideal behavior.

Social change in Japan has not been seriously hampered by loyalty to old standards nor has it been particularly inspired by new Western models. The generally non-doctrinaire, pragmatic inclination of most Japanese has resulted neither in a status quo nor in a sweeping revolution but in a succession of gradual changes in response to specific situations, producing over the years a significant transformation in the nature of Japanese society. The postwar period has added nothing essentially different to this historic pattern of change, although the Occupation vastly speeded up the tempo of change for a short while. Such a pattern of social change would seem to indicate that the Japanese response to the stimulus of the Occupation is having gradual but profound long-range consequences. There was no immediate wholesale adoption of the American example; attempts to foist such an example bodily on the Japanese were quietly resisted or circumvented. But neither was there a blind and stubborn clinging to the past. The changes stimulated by the Occupation will undoubtedly be all the more permanently assimilated into Japanese life insofar as they were accepted by the Japanese of their own volition as suitable to their situation.

From one point of view, this interpretation would seem to minimize very greatly the importance of the influence of the Occupation on the general course of Japanese history. Even though the impact of the Occupation was such as to throw the Japanese quite off balance for a while, they were never completely swept off their feet, and they never fully lost control over the direction of their progress. Thus, even though the

Occupation program bore some aspects of wholesale change which justify in a sense its characterization as an induced revolution, there was not a true revolution in the sense of a complete destruction of the old and a bodily replacement of it by something totally alien. Even where there was a large degree of destruction of the old, the Japanese managed to retain some elements of continuity. The Japanese have even been sloughing off some of the measures which they once accepted under the Occupation but which they have now come to consider unsuitable and undesirable. These facts may cause some to conclude that the Occupation has been largely ineffective in its permanent effects.

From another point of view, however, these same facts can be seen to point up the notable success of the Occupation. If the Occupation had been a completely extraneous intrusion into Japanese life, imposing changes by sheer force alone, then the Japanese might have been expected to reject all the Occupation-sponsored reforms as soon as the force was removed. But, insofar as the Occupation represented just another situation—albeit an unprecedentedly big one—of the kind the Japanese had been reacting to in a pragmatic way for a century, they reacted to this situation as they had always tended to do. This meant that, although they accepted only a part of what was offered, what they did accept they accepted through their own decision about what was practicable for them. They may even reject some things which they once accepted, but what they decide to keep will probably be all the more firmly held for being the result of their own decision. The changes which the Japanese decide to retain may appear quite limited and modest; but even a seemingly minor measure, taken in response to an immediate exigency, can set in motion a chain reaction which may lead to an ultimately great change. It would seem that such a gradual process is the only way by which substantive social change in the direc-



tion of democracy, as distinguished from superficial institutional changes, can be soundly brought about. It would also seem, from the way most of the key reform measures of the Occupation period are being continued by the Japanese with not too much dilution, that such a process of social change is now actually working toward the steadily increasing democratization of Japanese society.

If democracy is taken to mean specific ideals and practices, it will be seen that the Occupation's program of effecting specific institutional reforms has been attained only in part, and the results might therefore be called disappointing. If democracy is considered a way of doing things through public decision, then the evidence is that this is just what the Japanese are doing—deciding, for instance, through the free interplay of their own ideas what changes they will accept—and, insofar as the Occupation contributed significantly to this result, it succeeded in its objective of stimulating democracy in Japan. Of course, in common usage democracy means both these things, and the Occupation, without much self-analysis or insight, tried to promote democracy in both aspects without distinguishing very clearly between them, necessitating consideration of each of them and adding to the confusion in appraisal. But, if the two are viewed separately, the Occupation did comparatively poorly—but even then, not too badly—with respect to the first meaning of the term and did remarkably well in the second meaning of the term, which is the more essential.

Japan still remains so different from the West that comparison might easily leave the impression that Japan has undergone no fundamental change. But a comparison of the Japan of today with the Japan of a hundred or fifty or even ten years ago cannot fail to reveal the highly significant social and cultural change that has taken place, even though much of it remains veiled behind the façade of traditional forms. In contributing



the stimulus, even if not the direct control or motivating power, for the most rapid and intensive period of such change, the Occupation exercised an influence on Japanese history which can hardly be exaggerated. In stimulating changes which, however modest, set Japan on vitally important steps in the direction of further sound democratic development, the Occupation for all its shortcomings must be judged on balance as a magnificent success.

Unfortunately, however, it is not possible to end on a note of unqualified optimism. No matter how successful the Occupation and how soundly established the present Japanese trend toward democracy, there can be no assurance that democracy will prevail in Japan. The Japanese are not entirely masters of their own destiny; their own proclivities may not decisively shape their fortunes. Whatever their own desires, in this age of global conflicts and international interdependence it is not likely that they could long hold out as a beleaguered democratic outpost if powerful nations and extensive areas in their general neighborhood should fall to militantly antidemocratic regimes which would exert upon Japan strong pressures—whether military, economic, ideological, or psychological. The problem of Japan, like that of all countries today, is no longer a national but a world problem.

*Specimen of modern  
Italic writing based on  
Italian chancery.*

horizon — as if the whole terre  
had been one jewel, one colossal  
single gem fashioned into a pl

*The half-uncial letters  
of Edward Johnston,  
which were the basis of  
the movement toward  
manuscript writing in the  
United States in the  
1920's.*

half-uncial modern  
straight-pen writing  
round, upright, formal

*The chancery cursive  
hand of Italian writing  
masters of the sixteenth  
century.*

*perche' al'occhio mio la littera  
corsiva ouero cancellarescha  
vuole hauere*

*Spencerian writing from  
the hand of Spencer.*

*you have one of  
dispose of please  
will call, and ex*

## IS ITALIC WRITING COMING BACK?

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ITALIC WRITING IS SWEEPING GREAT BRITAIN.  
HANDWRITING EXPERT FRANK N. FREEMAN  
SUGGESTS WE TAKE A LOOK AT IT  
BEFORE IT CROSSES THE OCEAN.

Word has come to this country of a style of handwriting that is growing in popularity in Great Britain. The style is said to be superior to those commonly used there. Since the enthusiasm will probably spread to the United States, it is worthwhile to evaluate this style as best we can.

In the past we have adopted new systems on the basis of partial evidence and inadequate study, and later we had to backtrack. Certainly it behooves us to take a good look before we leap.

The style of writing in question is called Italic writing and is advocated by Reginald Piggott in his book, *Handwriting, A National Survey*. The style is not really new, but a slight modification of minuscule script, a style used for writing manuscripts before the age of printing. This style was revived by Sir Edward Johnston, the calligrapher, in about 1900. It was

adopted for schools in what became known as manuscript writing and is now used in this country in 85 per cent of the schools as an introductory style of writing in the first two grades.

The Italic writing, advocated by Piggott, is derived from Sir Edward Johnston's script. In the Italic style, Johnston's script is made over into a slanting style, and the letters are connected. The writing is still done with a broad-edged pen, so that the downstrokes are broad and the upstrokes narrow. This style is confused by Piggott with the early Italian *cancellaresca*, or chancery, hand, which is really the ancestor of our common script. According to Piggott, since 1950 some fifty textbooks, sets of copy books, and manuals have been published in the Italic style.

Piggott's book is profusely illustrated with examples of his own writing. Since he is an expert, his samples are attractive and legible. A great many examples by other writers are also included. Some of these specimens are admirable, others less so.

The author sketches the history of handwriting styles in England. He tells us that the copperplate style—with its long loops, extreme slant, and flourishes—is named for the copperplate engravings employed in copy books, which were used in teaching handwriting until the middle of the nineteenth century.

The copperplate style was later modified and became the so-called civil service hand, typified in the Vere-Foster System. This system was plainer. It had less slant, shorter loops, "a comparatively high degree of legibility" and could be "written with reasonable speed," Piggott notes.

His opinion of this style seems a bit uncertain, for two pages later he writes, "Unfortunately the Civil-Service style is not compatible with speed, if it is to attain legibility. Written

quickly the loops become enlarged and badly formed and the height of the small letters becomes inconsistent."

Piggott's ideas on legibility are quite confused. Italic style, he says "has the distinct advantage (in its model form) of being a hundred-per-cent legible due to the complete simplicity of the letters."

It is obvious that Piggott is using a dual standard for judging legibility. He is thinking, first, of the legibility of a style "in its model form" and, second, of its legibility as it is actually written. The latter is more to the point. All styles are completely legible in their model or ideal form, but handwriting has to be read as it is actually written, not as it appears in the copy book.

The only useful method of judging the legibility of various styles, therefore, is to measure their legibility as they are written by a large number of randomly selected individuals, writing under comparable conditions. Piggott did not attempt such a test.

It is not clear from the author's account just what he included in his survey. He says that he has a comprehensive collection of all types and styles of handwriting that he has gathered over many years. According to his book, he has received many letters in response to articles that he has contributed to magazines from time to time.

Recently he made a request for samples that was carried in a large number of newspapers, journals, and trade periodicals. He asked that handwriting specimens be sent to him along with information on the writer's age, sex, occupation, handedness, and type of pen used. He reports that he received more than twenty-five thousand replies. We assume that the tables and charts in his book are based on this batch of twenty-five thousand letters.

When Piggott classified and tabulated the data from the letters, we assume that he included all of them, though he

does not definitely say so. Nor does he give the data from which this fact may be established. His charts show only percentages, not actual numbers. This omission seriously limits the interpretation that can be placed on the findings.

The classifications for legibility are perhaps the most important. It would be highly desirable to have these judgments made objectively. The author evidently did the classifying himself and apparently did not try to get any check on his judgment. He gives no analysis of the criteria of judgment he used or any samples of the specimens he classified as almost illegible, moderately legible, fairly highly legible, or completely legible.

His remarks on legibility, some of which I have already quoted, give us reason to think that his standard of legibility may not be altogether objective. One could wish that this crucial step had been treated more satisfactorily.

More significant than the first-order classification are comparisons between the classes. The author draws comparisons only on the basis of occupation. For example, he gives the percentage of writers in the various occupations who use the various styles of writing. He reports that Italic style was used by 39.2 per cent of the artists and 2.1 per cent of the housewives. This information is interesting, but it would be more meaningful if we knew how many persons were in the two groups.

Piggott's findings tell us little or nothing about the value of the Italic style. He could have compared the legibility of this style with that of other styles. Even if we gave limited credence to the judgment of the author, a comparison would give us some basis for evaluation. The author's main interest is to promote the Italic style. It is strange that he did not take this opportunity to test its merits. As it is, he gives no statistical evidence whatever about its advantages.

No estimate can be made of the legibility of the various styles. But some tentative conclusions seem to be justified from a casual examination. The legibility of a given style may vary from writing that is almost impossible to read to writing that can be read with no effort at all. Each style of writing may be so written that each letter is clear and distinct or so that each letter is poorly formed and hard to distinguish. The various letters in each style may be well spaced from their neighbors or crowded against one another. Words and lines may stand apart distinctly or be intermingled.

Hence, all styles are subject to variations that make the writing legible or illegible. The ideal shape of the individual letters does not determine legibility. Even the contour of a word as a whole has a definite influence, since for the most part we read by words, not by letters.

A recent doctoral dissertation by Elaine M. Templin, of New York University, brought out two important facts about handwriting: First, examples of a given style vary widely in legibility. Second, it is difficult to make a reliable comparison of the legibility of different styles.

The author gave examples to show the wide range of legibility within each of three styles. She used an objective method of measuring the legibility of the writing and an elaborate statistical technique for comparing the scores of the three groups.

Using these precautions, she was not able to establish a significant difference in the legibility of the three styles, one of which was manuscript writing. This style would seem to have at least as good a claim to legibility as the Italic style.

Since the claim to superior legibility of Italic writing rests on shaky evidence, we suspect that the preference for this style is due largely to admiration for its aesthetic qualities, not its practical advantages. In any case the supposed superiority in

legitimacy is from sufficient reason to warrant that a nation scrap the style of writing taught in its schools to adopt the style proposed.

In weighing the proposal, the history and the circumstances of the teaching of handwriting in the United States would have to be considered.

In the early part of the nineteenth century, the prevailing style in England was similar to that in the United States. This was derived from a slanting script that appeared in Italy in the sixteenth century and was called *cancellaresca*, or chancery, script. It was a slanting, connected script, written without the broad downstrokes of minuscule writing. It became widely adapted to commercial use because of the speed with which it could be written.

It was this script that was adapted for instruction in the schools and was reproduced by copperplate engraving in copy books. The use of these copy books disseminated and standardized the style. It is exemplified in the so-called copperplate writing in England and the Spencerian writing in this country. It was originally written with a quill pen, with long loops and heavily shaded downstrokes. Much of the writing was slow, painstakingly careful, and doubtless done chiefly with the fingers. Use was confined to a minority of highly trained individuals.

About the middle of the century a somewhat freer style was developed. In England it was called the civil service style, and it still persists. It has shorter loops and is somewhat more rounded but still uses shaded downstrokes made with a fine steel pen.

In this country the modification was more radical and took place in two stages, both in response to the commercial de-



mand for an easier style and a wider diffusion of facility in writing.

The first stage was dominated by Platt R. Spencer, for whom the style was named. The letters in this style were simplified, the loops were shortened; and the writing was somewhat freer. But Spencerian writing did not differ much from the civil service style in England.

In the second stage elements were introduced that made the handwriting of both children and adults in the United States fundamentally different from the handwriting in England. These elements were first introduced into business schools and then into the public schools by such men as A. N. Palmer and C. P. Zaner, about 1890.

The element that was most emphasized, and for a time exaggerated, was the arm movement. What is essential is not arm movement only, but a free participation of the hand and arm in a swinging movement that carries the hand along from letter to letter across the page. The method calls for a fairly level position of the hand, which rests on the last two fingers, instead of the side. In this position the hand can slide easily across the page. The loops are shortened still more, the shading is eliminated, and the capitals are simplified.

The development of cursive writing in this country was interrupted in the nineties by the widespread adoption in the schools of the vertical style of writing, beginning about 1890. The style was advocated on two grounds: legibility and certain physiological considerations.

The legibility argument resembles that advanced for Italic writing and may be disposed of in much the same way. As for the physiological considerations, it has been argued that slanting writing causes the writer to bend his back and neck side-

ways. The position not only produces curvature of the spine, critics say, but causes eye strain by requiring a diagonal movement of the eyes.

The physiological objections to slanting writing were disposed of by showing that difficulties do not arise if two practices are followed. The paper should be placed directly in front of the writer at an angle with the vertical of about 30 degrees, and the forearms should be placed in symmetrical positions on the desk.

Vertical writing ran afoul of another difficulty which was not expected but became noticeable because of the American emphasis on movement as well as form. When the paper is placed with the sides perpendicular to the front edge of the desk, so that the downstrokes of the writing will be vertical, the forearm has to be drawn back as the hand progresses across the page to prevent the writing from running uphill. The position, of course, becomes awkward. The natural movement is to carry the hand across the page by a sideward sweep of the forearm across the page with the elbow as a pivot.

These difficulties led to the almost complete abandonment of vertical writing in the schools by 1910. Soon after the transition back from vertical writing to slanting writing, the method of psychological analysis and experimental study began to be applied extensively to the teaching of school subjects. This development made it possible to evaluate existing practices, to appraise proposed new practices, and to select their desirable features without including their disadvantages.

Our method of dealing with manuscript writing when it was brought over from Great Britain was mature. The style was studied carefully in the laboratory and the classroom. Its merits and limitations were considered, and it was finally in-

corporated into the lower grades as an introductory style. The method of handling this style was not left to the devices of the individual teacher but was carefully worked out in sets of textbooks and manuals.

In my judgment, Italic handwriting, like vertical writing, would not have the overwhelming superiority in legibility that is claimed for it. Italic handwriting, I believe, would fail to use the fluent, easy, and effective movement that has been developed and is used in the current American cursive style. My judgment is based on the history of the development of handwriting in this country and on various scientific experiments.

I am not opposed to all changes in style, but it seems desirable to make changes only after careful study. Once the decision to change has been made, the new style should be uniformly taught.

The situation would not then arise in which a great diversity of styles are taught with the result that a child frequently learns different styles as he moves from school to school or from grade to grade.

This confusion has existed in the past in our country. I myself was taught a modern version of the Spencerian system in the lower grades. I was converted to vertical writing in the upper grades and then subjected in high school to the mechanical drills of the arm movement system of an itinerant writing "professor."

It must be admitted that we have sadly neglected the technique of writing. The need is for a reform in teaching rather than a revolution in style.

I wish to again recommend emphatically that the style and

the method of handwriting in the schools be reasonably uniform and that changes be introduced only after careful study and experimentation.

To bring about a sweeping and radical change throughout the country would require a revolution in the training of teachers, in the preparation of textbooks, and in the retraining of teachers already in service. The change would be even more drastic than the retooling of the automobile industry.

Even if our educational systems could stand the cost, we do not have the centralized authority to carry out such a retooling. Both the theoretical and the practical considerations inspire the hope that the school leaders of the United States will not be lured into a hasty and ill-considered adoption of the Italic hand now being advocated in Great Britain and discussed in this country.

## MIDWAY Authors

GEORGE CRILE, JR., M.D., is head of the Department of General Surgery, at The Cleveland (Ohio) Clinic Foundation and of the Frank E. Bunts Educational Institute, Cleveland. His article on cancer is taken from *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine*, Spring, 1960.

DAVID DAICHES, the author of nearly twenty books, is a distinguished writer, teacher, and critic. A citizen of Great Britain, he has taught at the University of Chicago and Cornell University and, since 1951, has been university lecturer in English and fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge University. The article which appears here is taken from his newly revised book, *The Novel and the Modern World*, a classic in the field of literary criticism since it first appeared in 1939. The University of Chicago Press has recently issued a new edition. The chapter we chose has been completely rewritten from the original version.

FRANK N. FREEMAN has made a series of experimental studies on handwriting, including a motion picture. Formerly professor of educational psychology at the University of Chicago and later dean of the School of Education at the University of California at Berkeley, he has done research and written on psychology, mental growth, and individual differences. His article on handwriting is condensed from the *Elementary School Journal*, February, 1960.

DENISON B. HULL, whose translation of Aesop's *Fables* from the Greek of Valerius Babrius provides the basis for the delightful poems in this issue, is by profession an architect. A graduate of Harvard University, he confides that, in addition to translating Greek as a hobby, he also paints, draws, and writes "simple" music. Still another interest is fox-hunting; he has been a Master of Foxhounds, and is the author of *Thoughts on American Fox-Hunting*. His translation of Aesop's *Fables*, in verse, was recently published by the University of Chicago Press.

KAZUO KAWAI is well qualified to interpret the process of democratization in Japan for Americans. He is now professor of political science at the Ohio State University, where he has been since 1951. From 1932 to 1941 he taught at the University of California at Los Angeles. A Japanese citizen, he was in Japan when war broke out in 1941 and was made associate editor of the *Nippon Times*, the leading English-language daily in Tokyo, and in 1946 he became editor-in-chief, a position he held until 1949. The article here is taken from his book, *Japan's American Interlude*, published this spring by the University of Chicago Press.

CHARLES E. OSGOOD, professor of psychology and director of the Institute of Communications Research at the University of Illinois, first formulated the ideas he expresses in this issue on cold-war tensions while a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Palo Alto, California. He has also been a Guggenheim Fellow, and his major field of study includes "psychology of human thinking, language and communication." The article which appears here is condensed from *Conflict Resolution*, Volume III, Number 4.

MELVIN SEEMAN, whose report on his fellow intellectuals' views of themselves provides fascinating reading, is associate professor in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, at the University of California at Los Angeles. He holds a Ph.D. degree from the Ohio State University, where he taught for twelve years before moving to California in 1959. He is an advisory editor for the *American Journal of Sociology*, from which this article is condensed, and is currently working on research concerning the problem of alienation in mass society.

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